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Vl

Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-4-103(2)(h).
Introduction

This appeal concerns the district court's division of property and award of
alimony in a divorce. The district court imputed assets and income to the
husband before dividing the estate and awarded alimony in an amount that does
not allow the husband to make the minimum payments to service his debt.
The parties, Paul Rayner and Tanja Rayner, married in 1981, separated in
2010, and were divorced in March 2012. Paul stopped working in April 2008 and
the Rayners and their adult children lived off the family's stock investments.
The trial court imputed income to Paul retroactively, concluding that he
should have worked rather than living off investments before separation. The
court determined that Paul "dissipated" all the n1oney that was spent but could
not be accounted for frmn April 2008 to July 2010, long before their 2012 divorce.
The court determined that Paul owed Tanja the money that he might have
earned had he taken another job and the money that was spent before separation.
Additionally, when fixing alimony, the district court assigned Paul his
"own" debt-nearly $50,000 in unsecured debt accrued during the marriagebut allowed him only $250 in his budget to make the $1,550 minimum payments.
The court stated it was more important for Paul to take care of his wife than his
debt and that "there were some other things he could do about that."
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Statement of the Issues
Issue 1: Whether the dish·ict court erred when it valued and divided the
II

marital estate unequally, after determining that Paul dissipated" assets that in
fact he never earned, and that he "dissipated" assets that in fact were spent in the
two-to-three year period before separation, even without a finding that Paul
acted obsh·uctively.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's determination that

one spouse dissipated 1narital assets for abuse of discretion. Goggin v. Goggin

(Goggin II), 2013 UT 16, if16, 299 P.3d 1079. However, an error of law is an abuse
of discretion. Goggin v. Goggin (Goggin I), 2011 UT 76, if 26, 267 P.3d 885.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.221,243,254-257D.) To the extent

the issue is not preserved, this court should review for plain error. An
unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under the plain error doctrine,

State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, if 18, 122 P.3d 566. Claims for plain error require
obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, if 6,321 P.3d 235.
Issue 2: Whether the district court abused its discretion when it calculated

Paul's alimony obligations by assigning him all of his "own" debt, which had a
1ninimum monthly payment of $1,550 while simultaneously reducing his ability
to make those payments to only $250, the result of which is an alimony
obligation that he cannot actually satisfy, and which does not" equalize the
poverty" between the parties.

2

Standard of Review: This court reviews a dish·ict court's award of

alimony for abuse of discretion. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT App 357, ~7,
80 P.3d 153.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (R.213-14,244,260-61.) To the extent

the issue is not preserved, this court should review for plain error. An
unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under the plain error doctrine,
State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, ~18, 122 P.3d 566. Clailns for plai11. error require

obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, ~6, 321 P.3d 235.

Determinative Provisions

The followil1.g provisions are set forth at Addendum E:
Utah Code§ 30-3-5 (alimony statute)
Utah Code§ 78B-12-203(7) (imputation statute)
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
This divorce case concerns the division of the 1narital estate and alimony.

The parties married in 1981, separated in July 2010, and were divorced on March
20, 2012. Paul appealed certain components of that decision to this court.

In November 2013, this court issued Rayner v. Rayner (Rayner I), 2013 UT
App 269,316 P.3d 455. This court did not rule on the merits, but remanded the
case to the h·ial court for further findings. The trial court ordered supplemental
briefing on certain issues and entered its Supplen1ental and Amended Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 10, 2014. Those findings modify but
do not substantively change the outcome. On January 26, 2015, the district court
entered its Amended Decree of Divorce and Final Judgment. Paul appeals the
1nerits of the h·ial court's Supplemental and Amended Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce.
2.

Background

Paul and Tanja married in 1981. (R.1.) They have two children, who are
now adults. (R.2.) Paul is gay. (R.209,246,148:67-68.) Tanja is schizophrenic.
(R.148:14.) The parties "ended [their] marital relationship" in approximately 1986
but stayed together to raise the children. (R.148:62.) They lived separately in their
home in Bountiful, Utah. (R.209.) They started divorce proceedings in 2004, but
those proceedings did not result in a divorce. (R.148:62;210.) These divorce
proceedings began in 2010. (R.1.)
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In 1989, Paul earned a master's degree in computer science. (R.Pet.Ex.17.)
For many years, Paul worked for the LDS Church as a database designer in the
family history department. (R.148:55.) In 1998, he began working as an instructor
for the database company Oracle. (R.148:16,55;149:38.) He worked in "a very
specific area called data warehousing, which is a very specific part of a very
specific subset." (R.148:55.) In his words, "I was exh·emely skilled in an
extremely small section of the computer industry." (R.148:55.)
The Oracle job required extensive travel. (R.148:16,54.) Paul flew around
the United States and Canada to teach people about Oracle's product. (R.148:54.)
In a typical week, Paul would leave Salt Lake on a Sunday afternoon and fly to

the week's work location. (R.148:79.) He would teach an Oracle class Monday
through Friday, 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (R.148:79.) He would return to Salt Lake on
Saturday and fly out again on Sunday. (R.149:48.)
In approximately 2001, Paul was infected with HIV. (R.148:77.) By
approximately 2006, the disease had developed into AIDS. (R.148:73-74,77.) To
manage the disease, he takes an "HIV cocktail," which includes the drugs
kaleh·a, viread and epivir. (R.148:76.) Paul experienced frequent and severe
diarrhea as a side effect of the viread. (R.148:78.) Paul found this side effect to be
extremely problematic when he was traveling and teaching for Oracle seven days
a week. (R.148:78-79;149:48.)

5

In 2005 or 2006, Paul developed Reiter's Syndr01ne. (R.148:77;149:7.)
Reiter's Syndrome is a rare disease that attacks when the patient is overly
exhausted. (R.149:5-6.) vVhen he first experienced the disease, he went to the
hospital and, over the course of a week, every joint became inflan1ed and he
temporarily lost the ability to walk. (R.149:6.) Now, it flares up when Paul
becomes overly tired. (R.149:7.) To recover, he slows down, sleeps, and "get[s] a
little lazier." (R.149:7.)
Paul also suffers from neuropathy. (R.149:7.) He has no feeling in his feet.
(R.149:7.) Since 2009, he has had problems with his left hand. (R.149:61.) It is
"probably paralyzed," and likely to get worse. (R.148:57.) In June 2011, he had
surgery on his hand to decompress a nerve that was "squished" between the
elbow bone and the muscle. (R.149:8.) The surgery did not i1nprove matters.
(R.149:8.) The neuropathy renders him unable to type with his left hand and has
significantly affected his marketability. (R.149:9,10.) He testified at trial that
"[i]t' s impossible to den1onstrate computer skills just by lecture alone. You need
to show people how - you can't describe computer aspects of the database
especially without actually going into the database and showing. A lot of those
functions require two hands." (R.148:58.)
Additionally, he suffers from hypogonadism. (R.149:11.)
These health problems left him incapable of performing well at Oracle.
(R.148:56,149:12.) He received a warning letter in March 2008 (R.Pet.Ex.13) and
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was terminated in April 2008. (R.148:78-79.) As Paul described it, "[m]y health
was deteriorating over the last couple of years [before 2008], which is why they
[Oracle] terminated me, basically. I just couldn't meet their performance
expectations, and they will admit that they are a very aggressive company when
it c01nes to --- they said the average life expectancy of an Oracle employee is five
years, and I worked there 10. Many of my colleagues were let go at five, so I did
quite well." (R.148:56.)
As far as maintaining his computer skills, he explained "[t]he only reason I
would want to do that is if I was going to continue that high stress kind of work,
which according to my doctor is not suitable for me and my health. So I was
looking for something less stressful. I was trying to have a different lifestyle,
which my wife totally didn't want to do, and so I had to do that by myself.... I
can't afford from the cost of my health to do that kind of job that pays that kind
of money anymore." (R.148:67-68.)

In February 2008, Paul met his now-parh1er, Rich Mathis. (R.148:44.) At the
time, Mathis lived in New Castle, Delaware. (R.148:43-44.) After Paul was
terminated from Oracle, he and Mathis started two businesses together in two
multi-level marketing companies. (R.148:45;149:68.) Eventually they decided to
focus their energies on Melaleuca. (R.148:46-48.) They are still engaged with
Melaleuca, although it has not yet proved to be very profitable. (R.148:70.)
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Paul investigated other employment opportunities. (R.148:53;149:63-64.)
Within a week of being terminated from Oracle, he was offered a job in Juab
County School District. (R.148:53.) The school district wanted someone to design
a small database. (R.148:72.) They offered approximately $40,000/year. (R.148:7172.) However, Tanja refused to relocate from Bountiful, and Paul believed that it
was not econmnically feasible for him to relocate without her or to commute
from Bountiful to Juab County. (R.148:53,72.) He also believed that once he
designed the database, he would "have made [him]self out of a job." (R.148:72.)
He did not take the job. (R.148:72.)
He considered teaching at the University of Utah but it was not hiring at
the time. (R.148:56;149:64.) He has not sought a part-time lecturing position
because his hand is paralyzed and that renders it all but ilnpossible to give
lectures on how to use a computer. (R.148:57.)
During the 2008-2010 period, the Rayners made significant expenditures
on behalf of their children who were, at that time, young adults. (R.149:46-47.) In
July 2008, they bought their daughter a new car. (R.148:66;149:98.) They also gave
their daughter $13,000 as a deposit on a house, which she has now repaid, and
paid $1,800 for her electrical hook-ups. (R.148:65-67;149:47.) They paid their son's
college tuition (R.148:65;149:47) and signed on a student loan for their daughter.
(R.149:54-55.) They helped pay for their son's wedding and honeymoon.
(R.149:47,52.)
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The Rayners had significant investments in Oracle stock. (R.148:59;149:28.)
They began liquidating those investments. Between April 2008 and July 2010, the
Rayners liquidated approximately $300,000 of stock: $105,223 in 2008; $118,846 in
2009; and $65,840 in 2010. (R.148:64-65;114-15.) Paul testified that they liquidated
the stock on a n1onthly basis as needed. (R.148:65.)
Paul testified that, to slow the spending, he suggested the family cut back
on their spending, but they never did. (R.148:66.) Paul advocated selling the
family home in Bountiful which, in his view, was more expensive than they
could afford. (R.149:16,84-86,99.) Tanja refused. (R.149:16,84-86,99.) Paul
continued to pay the mortgage on the house until July 2010, when he "ran out"
of money. (R.148:60;149:55,85.) He and Mathis worked in the yard that summer
in the hopes of selling the house. (R.149:48-49.) In November 2010, foreclosure
proceedings were initiated. (R.148:22.)
At that time, Tanja' s sister paid off the first mortgage and brought the
second mortgage current. (R.34,111.) Tanja conveyed her interest in the house to
her sister by Special Warranty Deed, (R.111,Pet.Ex.4), but Tanja continues to live
there. (R.149:99.) She indicated that even now she refuses to sell it because her
attorney told her that "according to the law, I'm entitled to live as accustomed as
I've been living." (R.148:33;149:99,101.)
Paul traveled frequently _during the period April 2008 - July 2010.
(R.149:73-74.) Using the frequent flyer miles he accumulated while working for
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Oracle, he traveled around the counh-y visiting friends and h-ying to make his
Melaleuca business profitable. (R.149:73-74.) In January 2010, Paul stopped living
in. the Bountiful home. (R.148:34.) He lived in Delaware with Mathis for a period
of ti.me. (R.148:43-44.) In July 2010, Paul left the 1narital home permanently, and
Tanja asked him not to come back. (R.149:39,68;148:34.) 1 Mathis moved to
Layton, Utah, and Paul began living with him. (R.148:34.) At tl1at ti.n1e, Paul
stopped paying the mortgage on the Bountiful ho1ne. (R.148:34.)
Tanja also suffers from certain disabilities. She has schizophrenia and
panic attacks. (R.148:14-15.) She taught school for 16 years, but stopped in 1998.
(R.148:12,14-15.) Since then, she has received Social Security disability payments.
(R:148.27-28.) Paul first observed symptoms in his wife when they had been
n1arried only a few months. (R.149:81.) Over the years, she has spent many
1nonths in the hospital for her condition. (R.148:14;149:82.) The panic attacks
occur randomly and are difficult to regulate. (R.148:15.) To alleviate them, she
takes medication and watches TV. (R.148:15.)
At the time of h·ial, the marital estate included approximately $50,896 in
equity in the house (R.112;115); $10,807 in a retirement account of Tanja's (R.57);
$30,514 in a retirement account of Paul's (R.Pet.Ex.10); and less than $1,000 in

In Rayner I, this court indicated that the parties separated in January 2010.
Rayner v . Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ,r2, 316 P.3d 455. Although the parties drifted
apart during 2010, and Paul spent significant amounts of ti.me between January
and July with Mathis in Delaware, it is more accurate to say they "separated" in
July 2010, which is the montl1 that Paul stopped supporting Tanja. (R.113.)
1
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combined liquid assets (R.36,99,112,257B.) The parties had unsecured debts,
including credit card debt, their daughter's student-loan debt, and back-due
federal and state taxes, totaling $58,359.58. (R.102.)
2.1

The trial court's initial decision regarding dissipation

The trial court fixed $88,047 as the family's legitimate expenses because
that was an average of Paul's salary during the years 2003 to 2007. (R.113-14.)
The trial court also determined that Paul dissipated $172,095. (R.257B.) The trial
court's initial decision was based on the following calculations, which were reentered on remand. (R.113-15;254-56.) It is important to remember that the
parties did not separate until July 2010 and were not divorced until March 2012.
2008: In 2008, while the parties were still living together, Paul earned
$62,307 before he left his job in April 2008. (R.114;255A.) The trial court
subtracted $88,047 from $62,307 and decided the Rayners had a "shortfall" of
$25,740 in 2008. (R.114;255A.) Then, the trial court considered that Paul
liquidated $105,223 of his stock, which is $79,483 greater than the "shortfall."
(R.114;255A.) The court concluded that in 2008 Paul failed to earn and/ or must
have spent - "dissipated" - $79,483. (R.114;255A.)
2009: In 2009, while the parties were still living together, Paul did not earn
income. (R.114;255A.) The trial court determined that Paul should have made
$40,000 a year, but the family would still have required $88,047 in expenses, so
there would have been a "shortfall" that year of $48,047. (R.114;255A.) Paul
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liquidated $118,846 that year, which is $70,799 greater than the "shortfall."
(R.114;255A.) The court concluded that in 2009, Paul failed to earn and/ or must
have spent - "dissipated" -$70,799. (R.114;255A.)
2010: The parties separated in 2010 and Paul supported Tanja and paid the
mortgage through July 2010. (R.115;255A.) The court multiplied $88,047 by 7/12,
and also $40,000 by 7/12, and determined that there was a shortfall in 2010 of
$28,027. (R.115;256.) Paul liquidated $65,840 that year, which is $37,813 greater
than the "shortfall." (R.115;256.) The court concluded that in 2010, Paul failed to
earnand/or1nusthavespent - "dissipated" - $37,813. (R.115;256.)
The trial court also determined that, over the course of thirty-one months
during the marriage, between January 2008 and August 2010, Paul spent
$39,034.16 on six items that "were not used for legitimate marital purposes."
(R.258.) That number included $19,743.51 in Melaleuca products and services;
$14,077.97 in h·avel expenses; $3,215.68 on adult entertainment; $1,100 given to
Rich Mathis; $498 for legal services; and $399 for himself, his daughter, and
Mathis to go the Cedar Point amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio. (R.258;149:36.)
The court held that those expenditures "are illustrative" of other expenditures
Paul must have made, but gave no explanation. (R.258.)
Adding all those numbers together, the court concluded that Paul failed to
earn and/ or must have spent $188,095 during a two-year, seven-month part of
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their marriage. (R.257.) 2 The court allowed that the parties had spent $16,000 on
their daughter's car, which left an outstanding amount of $172,095. (R.257B.) The
trial court determined that Paul owed Tanja half of that, plus half of his
remaining retirement. (Id.)
The findings of fact described above are summarized in this table:
2008
Earned Income
Trial Court's Finding of Imputed Income
Income from sale of stock
Allowable family expenses
Difference (" dissipated")
2.2

62307
0
105223
(88047)
(79483)

2009

Jan- July
2010

0
40000
118846
(88047)
(70799)

0
23333
65840
(51360)
(37813)

The trial court's initial decision regarding alimony

As to alimony, the parties' financial declarations demonstrated the
following. Tanja indicated that she had $1,085.00 in net monthly Social Security
Disability Income (R.33-34) and $2,585 in monthly expenses (R.38,41.) The court
reduced her monthly expenses by $542.50, leaving her "reasonable monthly
expenses" of $2,042.50, and a remaining monthly need of $960. (R.116.)
Paul indicated that he has $138.70 in monthly income from Melaleuca
(R.98) and monthly expenses of $3,677.00, including $1,550 on monthly
installment payments (R.101-02;116-17.) The tr·ial court found the $1,550 number
"not reasonable," and instead allowed him only $250 to make his installment

2

In the initial findings of fact, the trial court mis-added its own numbers,

resulting in a total of $116,096. (R.115.) On remand, the trial court re-added and
came up with the higher number, which is at issue in this appeal. (R.256 n.l.)
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payments. (R.117.) The trial court reduced his other expenses by $329. (R.117.)
The trial court then subh·acted and determined his "reasonable monthly
expenses" were $1,948. (R.117.) In fact, that math contains an error: Paul's
reasonable monthly expenses were ($3,677 - $1,300 - $177 - $152) = $2,048.
The trial court imputed him income of $40,000 per year, which, after taxes,
is $2,666 per month. (R.116.) Subh·acting the "reasonable monthly expenses"
fron1 the iJ.nputed incon1e left Paul a surplus of $718. (R.117.) The trial court
ordered Paul to pay Tanja $700 per 1nonth. (R.117.)

2.3

This court's prior decision and remand

Paul appealed to this court. (R.159-72.) This court determined that the trial
court's factual findings were inadequate to support its conclusions and
remanded. (R.172.) On remand, the h·ial court ordered the parties to provide
supple1nental briefing as to the imputation and dissipation ele1nents. (R.179-80.)
Paul objected to the order, but complied. (R.182-89,198-205,208-15,235-46.) Tanja
responded (R.218-27.) No hearing was held. The trial court issued supplemental
and amended findings of fact in October 2014, (R.249-257E) and an amended
decree of divorce in January 2015. (R.296-99.) Paul appeals from that ruling.

14

Summary of the Argument

The trial court divided assets the spouses did not have and awarded
alimony one spouse could not possibly pay. Instead of dividing marital assets
and liabilities at the time of divorce, the district court divided the assets they had
in April 2008, when Paul was terminated from his job due to deteriorating health.
Both Paul and Tanja, as well as their children, used 1narital assets from April
2008 until the rune of separation in 2010, and therefore those assets did not exist

at the time of divorce. The district court nonetheless attributed to Paul the assets
the couple had as of April 2008, leading to a rather unfair division of property.
This property division 1nisconstrues the meaning of" dissipation" in two
ways. First, no Utah case has awarded a spouse retroactively-imputed income as
part of a property distribution. Imputation is appropriate only in forwardlooking child support and alimony calculations. No Utah case has awarded to a
spouse income that the other spouse did not earn during the marriage, after
holding that the spouse should have earned the income during the marriage.
Further, no Utah court has awarded a spouse money that was spent during
the marriage and no longer part of the marital estate. A court may divide money
that was "dissipated," meaning money that one spouse spent after separation in
an effort to act obstructively. But no Utah court has awarded a spouse money
that was "dissipated" before separation, let alone without finding bad faith.
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•
The trial court's decision here is unworkable, undesirable, and
unsupported by Utah law: it allows one spouse to complain that the other spouse
under-earned and over-spent during the marriage and requires that party to
rein1burse the complaining spouse upon divorce.
The trial court also erred when it calculated alin1ony. Ordinarily, a trial
court determ:ines how much 111onthly income is available to the parties, what the
parties' monthly needs are, and equitably distributes any deficit. Here, the trial
court assigned Paul to pay approximately $30,000 in credit card debt, $15,000 in
student loans for their daughter, and $10,000 in back-due taxes, but did not allow
him enough in his budget to make those payn1ents.
The 1ninin1um monthly payments on those debts, set by the IRS, Utah State
Tax Commission, student loan company, and credit card companies, were
undisputedly $1,550. But the trial court determined that those minimum 1nonthly
payments "are not reasonable." (R.116-17.) Instead, the court disregarded the
actual monthly payn1ents and found "that a reasonable payment on installments
is $250 .... [H]e has s01ne other things he could do about [his debts]. It is more
important that he support his wife, than to take care of those other claims."
(R.117.) The trial court did not specify what those "other things" were. The trial

court therefore allowed him $250 in his budget to make his $1,550 minimum
monthly payments and determined he could still afford to pay Tanja $700 per
month in aliinony. This leaves Paul an enormous shortfall.
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Argument
Paul appeals the trial court's (1) division of marital assets and (2) award of
alimony to Tanja.
1.

The trial court's division of marital assets errs because it incorrectly
concluded that Paul dissipated assets
Paul challenges the trial court's division of the marital estate. In short, the

trial court erred in determining that Paul dissipated any assets, and even if he
had, the trial court erred in looking at the dissipation of assets prior to the
separation. The court should have divided the marital estate according to the
customary formula, wherein each party is given half the estate.
The Rayners married in 1981, separated in 2010, and were divorced in
March 2012. But the h·ial court divided the estate as of April 2008, when Paul left
his job. The trial court also divided income that was n ever earned and was never
part of the marital estate: the trial court retroactively imputed income to Paul for
the period April 2008 to July 2010, and then divided it. Both of these decisions
are errors as a matter of law - and bad policy.
No Utah case has divided a marital estate as of twenty-seven months
before the parties separated based on the trial court's view of how the parties
should have handled their finances. Nor would such a rule be wise: divorce
courts do not, and should not, regulate the finances of married people or allow
them, upon divorce, to complain that the other spouse over-spent or underearned during the marriage and ask the court to rectify the situation.
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Moreover, no Utah case has divided assets that were never a part of the
marital estate because they were never earned. Such a rule would be
improvident; it would encourage litigation between divorcing spouses about
whether they earned or spent more or less than they should. Because such
litigation is unworkable and undesirable, Utah law allows only a division of
assets that exist or recently existed, not assets that might have existed had things
been different.
As described below, the trial court erred in three ways in its understanding
II

of the word dissipate." First, the trial court erred as a matter of law because it
II

incorrectly assumed that dissipation" could refer to potential income that was
never earned during a marriage. Second, the trial court erred as a matter of law
II

because it incorrectly assumed that dissipation" could refer to marital assets
that were spent during the marriage, before the parties separated, without a
finding that the spending party was acting obstructively. Third, even if a court
II

could find that dissipation" referred to marital assets that were spent before the
parties separated, without a finding of obstruction, the court additionally erred
as a matter of law because it improperly estimated the upper boundary of
potentially dissipated assets without evidence to support the conclusion that
Paul's behavior prevented the court from detennining how much was actually
dissipated.
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1.1

Customary procedure for dividing marital estates

Before discussing the Rayners' case, it is helpful to review the customary
procedure for dividing a marital estate. "Generally, each party is presumed to be
entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital
property ... at the time of the divorce decree or trial." Goggin. v. Goggin. (Goggin.

II), 2013 UT 16, ,r,r47,49, 299 P.3d 1079 (alterations 01nitted). Customarily, "[t]he
value of marital property is determined as of the time of the divorce decree or trial.
The reason for the rule is that by the very nature of a property division, the
marital estate is evaluated according to what property exists at the time the
marriage is terminated." Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (emphasis added) (internal alteration, citation, and quotation marks
omitted).
But because Utah Code section 30-3-5(1) permits courts to issue equitable
orders relating to marital property in divorce cases, the traditional procedure
may occasionally be modified "where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden
its value or otherwise acted obstructively." Goggin. II, 2013 UT 16, ,r49 (alterations
and internal quotation marks omitted). To compensate one spouse for the other's
dissipation, the court may "value a marital asset at some time other than the time
the decree is entered, such as at separation., or may otherwise hold one party
accountable to the other for the dissipation of marital assets." Id. (e1nphasis
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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It appears that the first Utah appellate case allowin.g a trial court to divide

the 1narital estate as of a date other than the date of divorce on the basis of
dissipation was Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In Peck, the
disputed asset was the husband's business. Id. at 1051. "At about the time the
parties separated," the husband "closed all [his business's] corporate accounts
and thereafter ceased all record keeping." Id. At h·ial, the husband asserted that
during the period between separation and divorce, the business had dwindled
fron1 as much as $1,000,000 to negative $50,400. Id. The trial court suspected that
the husband "had failed to fully disclose the company's true value." Id. This
court allowed the trial court to divide the estate as of the date of separation,
rather than divorce, in order to compensate for the fact that the husband may
have dissipated or hidden the value of the business in an effort to avoid losing it
in the divorce. Id. at 1052. This court recognized that "[a]ssets are usually valued
at the rune of the divorce decree," but cited California case law for the
proposition that, "where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or
otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, under its broad discretion,
value the property at an earlier date, i.e., separation." Id.
Following Peck, several Utah cases have allowed a trial court to divide
marital property as of the date of separation rather than the date of divorce if it
appeared that one party had hidden, spent or otherwise obstructed assets during
the litigation. In Ouk v. Ouk, for example, the petition for divorce was filed in
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December 2007. 2015 UT App 104, ,r2, 348 P.3d 751. Two and a half years later, in
June 2010, after the parties were legally divorced, but still before their property
had been divided, the husband opened a $185,000 line of credit on the marital
home "without [the wife's] knowledge and [she] never received any benefit or
funds from that line of credit." Id. ,r,r2, 12. Because the money was unaccounted
for, the trial court determined that the husband had dissipated those assets and
this court affirmed. Id. ,r14.
Other cases have followed the same pattern: a n·ial court may divide a
marital estate as of the date of separation where it appears one spouse hid, spent,
or otherwise obstructed assets during the pending divorce litigation. Below are a
few examples:

• Donnelly v. Donnelly, 2013 UT App 84, ,r,r45, 47,301 P.3d 6 (affirming
division as of date of separation and listing cases where it was
appropriate to use valuation as of date of separation);

• Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ,r,r12-13, 169 P.3d 754 (affirming
calculation of stock's value based on average price on various dates
during period of separation);
•

Parker v . Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ,r,r3,12, 996 P.2d 565 (affirming

valuation of estate on day of separation rather than day of divorce
where wife appeared to have spent $100,000 to "live on" during
pendency of action);
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•

Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508,516 n.14 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (trial

court did not abuse its discretion when valuing estate as of date of
separation because husband acted obstructively in failing to give
accurate verifiable accountings of income and assets on day of trial);
•

Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (trial

court did not abuse its discretion in dividing marital estate as of date
of separation rather than date of divorce where one spouse had
"depleted the liquid assets of the marital estate during the pendency
of the action");
•

Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,687 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Peck

for proposition that trial court may value property as of two weeks
before trial if one party hides or dissipates assets);
•

Andersen. v. Andersen., 757 P.2d 476, 479-80 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(remanding to trial court to detennine what had happened to $5,000
in IRA that was liquidated between time of separation and time of

•

divorce).
Paul has found no Utah cases dividing marital assets of a date earlier than
separation, as the court did here. Nor has Paul found any Utah case dividing
assets that never existed but only could have existed had the parties lived their
lives differently, as the court did here.
Each of these errors is described below.
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1.2

The trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined
that income that was never earned, but only imputed, could
be considered "dissipated"

First, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it "imputed" to the
·· marital estate money that was never earned. (R.255A,256 (attached at Addendum
C)) Specifically, the trial court determined that, after he left Oracle when his
health deteriorated, Paul was obligated to work rather than live off his
investments. The trial court detennined that, even with his physical limitations,
Paul was capable of earning - and "should have earned" - $40,000 per year.
(R.254,255A,256.) 3 In total, the trial court added into the body of divisible marital
assets $63,333 that was merely imputed income - not income that in fact never
existed.
"Imputation," as it is used in Utah Code section 78B-12-203(7)(a), allows a
court to impute income to a spouse when determining the spouse's income as
part of a child support calculation. The analysis requires the court to determine
"whether the [spouse] is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed and, if so,
how much inco1ne ought to be imputed." Christian v. Christian, 2014 UT App 283,

The trial court also made these specific findings. The court determined that Paul
earned more than this during 2008, so he had met his obligation. (R.255A.) But in
2009, he earned $0, and so the trial court added $40,000 into the corpus of
divisible marital assets. (R.255A.) And in 2010, the trial court only considered
that part of the year that Paul did support Tanja and pay the mortgage; the trial
court determined that Paul "should have earned" 7/12 of $40,000, or $23,333.
(R.256.) The trial court added that number to the body of divisible marital assets.
(R.256.) The trial court gave no explanation as to why it believed Paul was
obligated to support Tanja until - but only until- they separated.
3
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if 3, 341 P.3d 254 (internal quotation marks omitted). "A spouse is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed when [he or she] intentionally chooses of his or
her own free will to become w1employed or w1deremployed." Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Iinputation is a standard part of calculating child support, and may also be
helpful when calculating alimony. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-203(7)(a), 30-3-5(8)(a)(ii);

Rayner v. Rayner (Rayner I), 2013 UT App 269, if10, 316 P.3d 455 (attached at
Addendum F). The purpose of allowing imputation is to ensure that neither
spouse is voluntarily under- or unemployed for purposes of calculating support
for the1nselves, their ex-spouses, or their children. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-203(7)(a),
30-3-5(8)(a)(ii); Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, if10.
Notably, the court's authority to award both child support and alimony is

prospective. Utah Code§§ 78B-12-202(1), 203(1). Paul has found no Utah case that
extends imputation to the context of distributing marital assets, like the court did
here. In other words, no Utah case has retroactively imputed income to a spouse
and then divided the imputed income as if it were a marital asset, ordering one
spouse to pay the other imputed wages.
Nor should this court allow such a procedure to become the law. Were
such a process part of divorce law, innumerable divorce cases would ask
whether one spouse had been voluntarily unemployed or undere1nployed during

the marriage and, if so, allow the judge to impose on the underearner a debt of all
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•

the money he or she might have earned. The implications of this are endless: stayat-home parents, career students, people whose parents support them, people
taking early retirement, underearners married to overspenders, people who
1-

~

-

•

would rather work less than their absolute maxilnum, and, as here, those who
need not work because they have adequate investments at their disposal. Indeed,
the purpose of a divorce proceeding is to allow the parties to separate and move
forward, not to compensate one party for any of the other's perceived wrongs

during the marriage. Bell v. Bell, 2013 UT App 248, if21, 312 P.3d 951.
The trial court's imposition on Paul that he should have worked rather
than live off his investments, and that he now owes to Tanja all the money he
could have earned had he (or they) chosen otherwise, is unsupported by Utah
law, bad policy, and error as a matter of law. This court should reverse that
ruling, make clear that imputation is not to be used to retroactively build the
marital estate, and eliminate $63,333 of the trial court's calculation of dissipated
assets. 4
4

Even if this court concludes that the trial court did not err when it concluded
that the term" dissipation" can refer to income that was imputed but was in fact
never ea1ned, the trial court still erred because it considered Paul's imputed gross
income but, at most, should have considered only his imputed net income. The
failure to consider Paul's tax burden constitutes plain reversible error. Fullmer v.
Fullmer, 2015 UT App 60, ,Ill, 347 P.3d 14 (describing plain error standard);
Widdison. v. Widdison, 2014 UT App 233, ,Il0, 336 P.3d 1106 (re1nanding for
findings on tax consequences of custody decision). In its alimony determination,
the trial court assumed Paul had a 20% tax burden. (R.116.) Yet in computing the
dissipated marital assets, the trial court considered the full $40,000 per year,
rather than the net income. (R.255A,256.) Paul has argued that using any amount
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1.3

The trial court erred as a matter of law when it determined
that II dissipation" can ref er to money that was spent before
separation without a finding of obstruction

Second, the trial court erred when it determined that" dissipation" applied
to marital assets that were spent in the twenty-seven months before the parties
separated even though there was no finding of obstructive behavior. For the
reasons described below, this court should reverse the trial court's decision as a
1natter of law and vacate the remaining $108,762 from the calculation of
dissipated assets.
"Assets are usually valued at the time of the divorce decree." Peck, 738
P.2d at 1052. The reason for this is clear: "[T]he court must distribute the items of
marital property .. . with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with
his or her separate life." Bell, 2013 UT App 248, if21. For this reason, " [e]ach party
is .. . presumed to be entitled to ... fifty percent of the 111arital property." Dunn

v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). But for the sake of equity,
"where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted
obstructively, the trial court 1nay, under its broad discretion, value the property
at an earlier date, i.e., separation." Peck, 738 P.2d at 1052.
Two points are relevant.

of imputed income is incorrect; but if this court rejects that argument, it stands to
reason that only the net amount should be considered dissipated because Tanja
would not have r eceived any share of Paul's income taxes. At a minimum, this
court should vacate 20% of $63,333, or $12,666.66 of the trial court's calculation of
dissipated assets.
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1.3.1

The trial court erred because it divided the marital
property twenty-seven months before separation

First, the trial court did not divide the property at separation, but reached
back twenty-seven months before the parties separated and divided the assets as of
that date. (R.255A.) As described supra, Paul has found no Utah case dividing a
marital estate as of a date before separation, nor has he found any Utah case
finding dissipation as of a date earlier than separation.
The absence of such a case reflects the policy that underlies divorce
proceedings: the distribution of marital property during a divorce is intended to
help people move forward with their lives, not to compensate the spouses for the
other's actions during the marriage. Utah law does not regulate people's
expenditures during their marriages; does not assign each party an economic
value upon divorce; and does not atte1npt to determine whether married parties
spent their money in legitimate or not legitimate ways or earned or did not earn
their potential. Nor is divorce law intended to equalize spousal behavior during
the marriage in terms of dollars or compensate spouses for the other's behavior
during the marriage. A rule that allowed for assets to be divided prior to
separation is subject to extreme abuse.
This court should reverse the trial court's ruling as a matter of law and
clarify that a marital estate should not be divided inequitably as of a date earlier
· than separation on the basis of dissipation.
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1.3.2

Even if this court concludes that dissipation may occur
before separation, the trial court nevertheless erred in
finding dissipation because it did not find that Paul acted
obstructively

Second, not only did the court divide the 1narital estate as of twenty-seven
months before the parties separated, but it did so without fin.ding that Paul acted
obstructively. The guidance of this court and the Utah Supreme Court makes
clear that the court may divide the marital estate inequitably "where one party
has dissipated an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial
court 1nay, in the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some
time other than the tiine the decree is entered, such as at separation." Goggin II,

2013 UT 16, if49 (e1nphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). The term
"obstructively" indicates that whatever behavior that caused the money to be
spent must have been obstructive: Goggin II offers the dissipation of an asset and
the hiding of an asset's value as two examples of obstructive actions. Id.
The logical corollary is that non-obsh·uctive actions would not justify a
departure from the customary 50/50 division of marital assets. In other words,
the term" dissipation" does not simply refer to all spending by one spouse, but is
merely one example of actions that have been done" obstructively." Were it
otherwise, the trial court could divide a marital estate inequitably on the basis of
any or all spending during a marriage and call it" dissipation."
Rather than finding that certain expenditures were" obstructive," or made
for the purpose of dissipating the marital estate, the trial court foU11d that Paul
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spent $39,034.16 on items that the court thought were "not legitimate marital
expenses." The terms are not synonymous, and a holding by this court that they
were would lead to absurd results. Consider for example, the many non-essential
items spouses purchase that the other spouse does not use and of which the other
spouse may or may not consider "legitimate": clothing, shoes, personal products,
vacations, gifts, hobbies, vehicles, luxury items, even sometimes job training or
higher education. Some judges might not consider those items "legiti.J.nate
marital expenses," but neither does Utah law consider them" obstructive"
spending that must be paid back upon divorce.
The trial court's first and second set of findings are described below. To be
clear, twice the trial court failed to find that Paul acted obstructively. The lack of
findings does not mean this court should remand; it means the record does not
have evidence that would support such a finding.
In its first set of findings, the trial court determined that Paul improperly
spent nearly $200,000 during the marriage, although it could not identify what
the allegedly improper purchases had been:
Now the Court knows that the respondent's position is he spent all
of that. But the fact is that to support the family in the way they
were accustomed to be supported he did not need to spend that. He
spent a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment on doing
things that were not by way of family expenses and so regardless of
it supposedly having been spent already, the amount of retirement
proceeds ... should be equally divided ... .
(R.115 (attached at Addendum A.))
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This court rejected those findings in Rayner I, writing: "the evidence
addressing the use of the liquidated assets was disputed, and subsidiary findings
cannot be reasonably implied. The h·ial court did not explain why it concluded
that the liquidation and spending of the assets qualified as dissipation." 2013 UT
App 269, ,T22 (citation 01nitted). This court also criticized the trial court for failing
to heed the "extensive testimony and exhibits [that] were presented regarding
how the liquidated funds were spent." Id. In fact, as this court observed, so much
testimony was presented that the trial court expressly decided not to review it:
"[t]here were 1nany docu1nents filed and staten1ent[s] as to what inco1ne and
expenses were. There was 1nuch that would have taken a forensic accountant to
analyze." Id. (quoting the trial court at R.114.) Given these flaws, this court
concluded that the trial court's statement" does not provide' sufficiently detailed'
support for the trial court's conclusion," and therefore re1nanded. Id. ,r,r22-23.
On remand, the trial court's "amended" and "supplemental" findings are
longer and have more paragraph breaks, but they too make no mention of the
motivation for Paul's spending. They simply state that certain expenditures are
"not used for legitimate marital purposes" - a characterization that drastically
changes the test from obstruction. This brief copies at length the relevant
amended and supplemental findings to demonstrate that there are no findings
that Paul's spending was obstructive. In short, the new findings are no more
adequate than the original to support a finding of dissipation:
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56.
Because Respondent, and not Petitioner, had control over the
amount that he liquidated from his retirement funds ... and because
Respondent, and not Petitioner, had primary control over and access
to the liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to
attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets ....
57.
Respondent's testimony that it was Petitioner that dissipated
these marital assets is not supported by financial documentation and
is not credible given that he had primary control over and access to
the liquidated retirement funds.
58.
. . . Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated marital assets
were actually used for some legitimate marital purpose.
59.
While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and
where all of Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent,
the financial documentation demonstrates that:

•

In Nove1nber 2009 and April 2010, Respondent wrote
checks totaling $1,100 to Richard Mathis;

•

In March 2010, Respondent purchased three season passes
to Cedar Point, an amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio, for
Respondent, the parties' daughter, and Mr. Mathis, which
totaled $399;

•

Fro1n January 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent
$3,215.68 on adult entertainment, including viewing
pornography via the Internet and television, and
frequenting private men's bathhouses, hotels, and adult
themed boutiques and stores;

•

From May 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $498
for legal services frmn ARAG Legal Services;

•

From January 2008 through August 2010, Respondent
made $19,743.51 in purchases of Melaleuca products and
services; and

•

From April 2008 through July 2010, Respondent spent
$14,077.97 while traveling to locations, including as [sic]
Delaware, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and California.
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60.
These expenditures, [totaling $39,034.16] which Respondent
1nade fro1n his liquidated retirement funds, were not used for
legitimate marital purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's
dissipation of the parties' marital assets for his personal expenses
that were above and beyond that of the parties' historical
expenditures.
61-64. [finding not credible Paul's argu1nents that the six
enumerated expenditures were legitimate family expenses]
65.
Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds
on his personal expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes,
that these expenditures were not consistent with the parties'
historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a
substantial a1nount of the parties' 1narital estate, that Respondent
had primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement
funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient
documentation to precisely account for how and where the
liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate and
equitable to hold Respondent accountable for the entire amount of
the dissipated marital assets.
(R.256-257B) (emphasis added). The court subtracted $16,000 for the daughter's

car and concluded that Paul is accountable for $172,095 in dissipated assets. (Id.)
It is essential to recognize that the trial court did not find that these

expenses were obstructive, but were simply "not legitimate." And the court did
not explain each item. Consider the most significant single expense of the
$39,034.16: $19,743.51 for Melaleuca healthcare products and services for the

thirty-month period fr01n January 2008 (rather than April 2008) to August 2010
(rather than July). (R.257;148:18.) Paul testified that the parties had purchased
items from Melaleuca for over twenty years and that, in the last few years, he
and the parties' children used primarily Melaleuca vitamins and cleaning
supplies. (R.149:88-89.) Tanja indicated that Paul bought Melaleuca products
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mostly for himself: vitamins, creams, and muscle builders. (R.149:99.) Paul did
not disagree; he credits the Melaleuca products with having significantly helped
his health and, in particular, alleviating his AIDS symptoms. (R.148:48-49.)
But the court concluded that the Melaleuca purchases were not legitimate
marital expenses because they were Paul's "personal expenses" and not
consistent with the parties' historical expenditures. (R.257A.)
Regardless of the factual truth of this statement, the legal conclusion is
incorrect. Without a finding that Paul's spending was obstructive, pre-separation
spending on his "personal expenses" cannot be considered dissipated. Were it
otherwise, one spouse's spending on themselves or on something their partner
did not approve - or claimed upon divorce to have not approved - could
always be considered "dissipation." Divorce courts would find themselves
weighing each partner's spending over the course of the marriage to determine
what was "legitimate" and what was not. To avoid this unworkable scenario, the
case law of this court and the Utah Supreme Court indicates that the estate
should be divided equally to the spouses unless one party has acted
obstructively through dissipation, hiding assets, or some other action.

In short, the court's finding that Paul's spending before separation was
"dissipation" is unsupported by case law, and no evidence suggests that Paul
acted obstructively. This court should reverse as a matter of law the conclusion
that Paul" dissipated" the marital estate by spending money prior to separation.
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1.4

The trial court erred as a matter of law because it estimated
the "upper limit" of possible dissipation and therefore
failed to adhere to Rayner I's mandate

Even if this court disagrees with the above, and concludes that a marital
estate may be divided twenty-seven months before the parties separate without a
finding of obsh·uction, the h·ial court's decision still fails under the guidelines set
forth in Rayner I. Specifically, the trial court erred as a matter of law when it
concluded that Paul should be held responsible for the difference between the
am.aunt that the trial court detennined was actually dissipated ($39,034.16) and
the amount the trial court determined was presumably dissipated ($172,095). The
difference at issue in this argument is $133,060.84.

In Rayner I, this court explained that, when considering dissipation, h·ial
courts are instructed to consider multiple factors: "how the 1noney was spent,
including whether funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses or
individual expenses; the parties' historical practices; the 1nagnitude of any
depletion; the timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation and
divorce; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets." 2013
UT App 269, if19 (citations omitted). As explained above, such analysis should
be considered always in terms of whether the spouse's spending was obstructive.
The penalty for obstructive spending is harsher when a spouse attempts to
hide from the court the amount of 1noney spent. When "a spouse's behavior
prevents the court from deternuning the precise amount of dissipated assets, the
court should estimate, to the best of its ability, the upper limit of the amount of
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assets that the spouse may have dissipated." Goggin II, 2013 UT 16, if 53
(emphasis added). For example, in Goggin II, a case illustrating the proper
application of the estimation exception, the husband, during separation," acted
obstructively, "hid[] at least some of the assets," and" consistently refused to
respond to discovery requests and comply with the court's orders to provide an
accounting." Id.

,rso. Under those circumstances, the court was allowed to

"estimate . . . the upper limit of the amount of assets that the spouse may have
dissipated." Id. if 53.

Rayner I likewise emphasized that the" estimation" approach is
appropriate "only when" the spouse's behavior prevents the court from
determining the precise amount of dissipated assets. 2013 UT App 269, if22
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any such estimation
"must be supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial
court's basis for ... deviation [from the general rule]." Id. if21.

If there is not enough evidence to support the estimation approach, then
the marital estate must be divided according to the customary procedure: "When
insufficient evidence is presented to the court to support a finding of dissipation,
the general rules governing the valuation of marital property apply." Id. if22.
Here, the court made findings that Paul spent $39,034.16, but held that
amount was "illustrative" of the amount he should be held responsible for, or
$172,095. (R.256-257B.) This amounts to an improper "estimat[ion of] the upper
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limit of the amount of assets that the spouse may have dissipated," unless there
is evidence that Paul's behavior "prevent[ed] the court from determining the
precise amount of dissipated assets." Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, ~22 (internal
quotation marks 01nitted). There is not. And twice the trial court 1nade no
findings to that effect.
A portion of the h·ial court's supplemental findings of fact are reproduced
again below, this time with an emphasis on the trial court's conclusion that
because Paul spent $39,034.16 on items that the trial court considered to be nonlegitimate marital expenses, that number is "illustrative" and Paul should
actually be held responsible for $172,095:
56.
Because Respondent, and not Petitioner, had control over the
amount that he liquidated frmn his retirement funds . .. and because
Respondent, and not Petitioner, had primary control over and access
to the liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to
attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets ....
58.
. .. Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to
demonsh·ate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated 1narital assets
were actually used for some legitiinate marital purpose.
59.
While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and
where all of Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent,
the financial docu1nentation demonstrates that:

.. . [six enumerated expenses totaling $39,034.16] ...
60.
These expenditures, which Respondent made from his
liquidated retirement funds, were not used for legitimate marital
purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's dissipation of the
parties' marital assets for his personal expenses that were above and
beyond that of the parties' historical expenditures . . . .
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65.
Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retire1nent funds
on his personal expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes,
that these expenditures were not consistent with the parties'
historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a
substantial amount of the parties' marital estate, that Respondent
had primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement
funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient
documentation to precisely account for how and where the
liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate and
equitable to hold Respondent accountable for the entire amount of
the dissipated marital assets ... [which, subtracting $16,000 for the
daughter's car is] $172,095."
(R.256-257B (emphasis added).)

Nothing in these findings suggests that Paul's behavior prevented the
court from determining the precise amount of dissipated assets, as was required
by Rayner I. And, again as described by Rayner I, without such evidence or
findings to support it, the trial court was not authorized to estimate the upper
limit of potentially dissipated assets.
This court "cannot affirm [the trial court's] determination when the trial
court abuses its discretion by failing to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting its financial determinations." Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, ,r4 (internal
quotation marks omitted). "When insufficient evidence is presented to the court
to support a finding of dissipation, the general rules governing the valuation of
marital property apply." Id. ,r22.
The trial court has twice failed to make specific findings that Paul
dissipated the $133,060.84 difference between the amount that the trial court
determined was dissipated ($39,034.16) and the amount that finding illustrated
($172,095.) The reason the trial court has twice failed to make those findings is
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because no evidence supports those findi.J.1.gs. At a 1ninimum, this court should
vacate the h·ial court's finding that Paul's spending" illustrated" an additional
dissipation of $133,060.84.
Paul asks this court not to remand, but to rule as a matter of law that the
h·ial court incorrectly estimated the upper li1nit of potentially dissipated assets
and should instead have applied the general rules governing the valuation of
1narital property - i.e., to divide the marital estate in half as of the day of divorce.
1.5

The trial court's conclusion that Paul's expenditures were
"illustrative" of dissipation is further undermined

Even were it somehow true that Paul's spending and lack of earning
i.J.1.come constituted" dissipation," the trial court's conclusion is still inequitable
for at least two reasons. First, the h·ial court erred when it "just assmne[d]" that
the fa1nily' s legitimate family expenses were $88,047. (R.114.) Second, the trial
court erred when it failed to critically consider Tanja' s involvement in the
deterioration of the falnily' s finances.
1.5.1

The trial erred when it "assumed" the family's legitimate
annual expenses were $88,047 and worked backward

The h·ial court fixed $88,047 as the falnily' s legitimate expenses because
that was an average of Paul's salary during the years 2003 to 2007. (R.113-14.)
The h·ial court "[found] this is a reasonable way to just assmne that it took
$88,047" to support the falnily. (R.114.) The trial court required all other

expenditures to be explained.
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In doing so, the trial court rendered an oversimplified and legally incorrect
formula: amount dissipated = money liquidated + money imputed ~ expenses

"assume[d]" to be reasonable. This formula cuts against repeated instructions from
this court and the supreme court that any finding of dissipation "must be
supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain the trial court's
basis for" deviation from the general rule that each spouse is entitled to half the
1narital estate on the day of divorce. Rayner I, 2013 UT App 269, «j[21 (internal
quotation marks 01nitted). The trial court is required to calculate "the precise
ainount of dissipated assets" and is allowed to estimate only where the spouse's
behavior prevents it from doing so. Goggin II, 2013 UT 16, «j[53; Rayner I, 2013 UT
App 269, «jf 20. Said differently, Goggin II and Rayner I teach that the amount of
dissipated assets should be found forward, not backward.
In fact, in Rayner I, this court critiqued as problematic the trial court's
approach of estimating the family's reasonable expenses: the court noted that
"rather than calculating the amount of assets actually dissipated, the trial court
based its valuation on an assumption of legitimate family expenses." 2013 UT
App 269, «jf 22 (emphasis added). This criticism underscores the above analysis
that the tr·ial court should have focused only on money that was actually shown
to be dissipated, and not ballooned the number for any reason.
But despite this court's criticism, the trial court did not change its
approach on remand. Even on remand, the trial court did not account for the fact

39

that the family had significant debt at this same tilne - an indicator that in fact
the family was spending more than it was making. Nor did the trial court
accom1.t for the fact that during the years in question, the Rayners paid for
several big-ticket items for their young adult children, including a basketball
court, cars, down payments, weddings, and college tuition. (R.211;R.149:46-47;
148:51-52,65,67.) The lTial court's assmnption that a family's legitimate expenses

should be presumed to be an average of the breadwinner's last five years of
salary is simply not a basis to then work backward to find the amount dissipated.
1.5.2

The trial court erred when it did not include the amount
of money that Tanja spent or wasted

The h·ial court's estilnation of the upper liinit of potential dissipation is
also undermined because the trial court failed to consider Tanja' s role in the
family's finances. The h·ial court stated that Paul had "primary" control over and
access to the funds, a staten1.ent that implicitly concedes that Tanja had
"secondary" control. (R.257A-257B.) And indeed, Tanja testified that she could
and did 1nake withdrawals from Paul's account, that she had no records of her
expenditures, that she had her own Social Security money that she did not
deposit into joint bank accounts, and that she used cash. (R.148:39-40;149:96-97.)
Paul repeatedly suggested that Tanja was responsible for spending too
much money. (R.199,202-04.) Having made that assertion, Paul was entitled to
have Tanja justify her spending. This court has explained: after an "initial
showing of apparent dissipation" by one party, the burden shifts to the other
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party "to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some
legitimate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30,

,r,r13, 15.

However, despite Paul's allegations, the trial court did not require Tanja to
prove or justify her own expenditures. Tanja conceded she withdrew $3,859 from
Paul's funds, but Paul alleged it was much 1nore than that. After Rayner I, when
the trial court asked for additional evidence, Paul also asserted that Tanja made
"undisclosed and unauthorized withdrawals from the [family] funds." (R.199.)
He indicated that in 2008, she withdrew $5,245.00 (R.202); in 2009, she withdrew
$6,324.41 (R.203); and between January and July 2010, she withdrew $8,512.01
(R.204.) That amount totals $20,081.42.

Paul also alleged that Tanja had been wasteful with the family's money.
Paul stated repeatedly that he tr·ied to sell the home and engage in other cost
saving measures but Tanja refused. (R.200;149:16,84-86,99.) He testified that she
spent several thousand dollars over budget on their son's wedding. (R.148:51-52.)
H e suggested that on January 1, 2008, Tanja's Horizon credit union account had a
balance of $127,000.00, but that by the time of tr·ial, that number had dwindled to
a negative $2,000.00. (R.205.) He noted that the combined amount of money
alleged by the trial court to be "missing" is roughly similar to the amount of
money that was owing on the mortgage and he informed the court that he
believed she used the money to pay h er sister to pay the 1nortgage. (R.34;239.)
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Tanja denied the spending, but never produced a forensic accountant or
any other expert to explain where her funds had gone. (R.200,218-27;149:96.) And
the trial court never required her to, even though this court's case law clearly
shifts the burden to her "to show that the funds were not dissipated, but were
used for some legifunate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30, if if 13, 15.
In short, both parties had access to marital funds during the marriage.
Without evidence regarding who spent what, and without any evidence that
Paul's behavior prevented the court from determining where the money went,
the h·ial court erred when it assmned that Paul spent every last missing penny on
non-marital expenses.
1.6

Summary of the trial court's errors regarding dissipation

In short, the trial court erred when it concluded that (1) imputed income
could be considered part of the marital assets; (2) a marital estate could be
divided long before the parties separated without findings of obstruction; and (3)
it was appropriate to esfunate the upper boundary of potentially dissipated
assets on the basis of "illustrative" expenditures. This court should vacate the
h·ial court's decision that Paul dissipated any assets. A proper calculation of the
result is provided in Argument 2.3.
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2.

The trial court's findings of fact regarding the value of the respective
retirement accounts are not supported by the evidence

The trial court considered that the assets on the day of divorce included
$50,896 in equity in the house;" approximately $10,000" in a retirement account
of Tanja's; and $30,514 in a retire1nent account of Paul's. (R.112,257B.) The latter
two nu1nbers are slightly different than the evidence. In each case, the error
favors Tanja. Paul respectfully asks this court to calculate the division of marital
assets using the evidence actually provided.
2.1

Tanja's retirement account

In the h·ial court's findings of fact, it first explained that Tanja' s retire1nent

account was "valued at about $11,000." (R.111.) Then, in its conclusions of law in
the sa1ne document, the trial court rounded this number down to
"approximately $10,000." (R.115.) The court used the $10,000 figure again in its
supplemental findings. (R.257B.) In fact, the documentation submitted by Tanja
shows the balance was $10,806.69, which rounds to $10,807. (R.57.) Paul asks this
court to correct the division of assets to use the more correct $10,807 figure that is
supported by the record.
2.2

Paul's retirement account

As to Paul's retirement account, the trial court valued this asset at $30,514.
(R.115;257B.) That number comes from Tanja's Exhibit 10, in which she
submitted a statement from Paul's retirement account for the quarter JanuaryMarch 2010. (Pet.Ex.10.) Paul submitted a more current statement, for the quarter
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July-September 2011, showing an account balance of $29,839. (Resp.Ex.8.) This
was received by the trial court. (R.149:22-23.) That is also the number he put in
his financial declaration. (R.100.)
The trial court gave no reason, and there is no sound justification, for using
the numbers provided by Tanja, which were more tha11 eighteen months out-ofdate at the time of trial, rather than the numbers provided by Paul. Paul asks this
court to correct the division of assets to use the more correct $29,839 figure that is
supported by the record.
2.3

Summary

The actual evidence shows that the assets include $50,896 in equity
(R.112;115); $10,807 in Tanja's retiiement account (R.57;257B); and $29,839 in
Paul's retirement account. (R.Resp.Ex.10;115,257B.) Those assets total $91,542.
Because there is no equitable reason to divide the marital estate other than
iJ.1 half, each party is entitled to $45,771. Tanja has already been awarded tl1e
marital home, and so she should be attributed $50,896 iJ.1 equity. To equalize the
estate, this court should award Paul the full value of his Deseret Mutual Tax
Sheltered Annuity Plan ($28,839), the full value of Tanja's retiiement account
($10,807), and a judgment against Tanja in the amount of $6,125.
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3.

Alimony

The trial court also erred :in fix:ing the alimony award. The court abused its
discretion when it assigned Paul to pay :installment debt that has m:inimum
monthly payments of $1,550 and yet allowed him only $250 :in his budget to do
so, leav:ing him no real disposable income that allows him to pay alimony. The
court made this determ:ination :in its :initial divorce decree. (R.116-17,122.) Paul
raised it aga:in on remand but the trial court entered the same determination.
(R.213-14,244,298.) This fails to allow Paul to make his debt payments, and fails
to "equalize the poverty" between the parties.
The purposes of alimony are "(1) to get the parties as close as possible to
the same standard of liv:ing that existed dur:ing the marriage, (2) to equalize the
standards of liv:ing of each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from
becom:ing a public charge. The core function of alimony is therefore economic - it
should not operate as a penalty against the payor nor a reward to the recipient."

Roberts v. Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ,114, 335 P.3d 378. Said differently, "[t]he
purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife and not to inflict punitive
damages on the husband." English v. English, 565 P.2d 409,411 (Utah 1977)
(:internal quotation marks omitted).
"Trial courts consider a number of factors when determining the amount
and duration of alimony, focus:ing pr:incipally on the three Jones factors: (1) the
f:inancial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the
recipient spouse to produce sufficient :income, and (3) the ability of the payor
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spouse to provide support." Roberts, 2014 UT App 211, ,r12 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Further, where post-divorce resources are insufficient to meet both parties'
needs, the court should split the deficit evenly. "When this situation arises, the
trial court must determine how to equitably allocate the burden of insufficient
income that occurs when the resources that were sufficient to cover the expenses
of a couple must now be stretched to accommodate the needs of two individuals
living separately." Keyes v. Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, if39,351 P.3d 90; see also Utah
Code § 30-3-5(8)(£) ("The court may, under appropriate circu1nstances, atte1npt to
equalize the parties' respective standards of living.").
The issue is preserved. But even if it were not, this court should review the
issue for plain error. An unpreserved issue may be addressed on appeal under
the plain error doctrine. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, if18, 122 P.3d 566. Clai1ns for
plain error require obvious, prejudicial error. State v. Lomu, 2014 UT App 42, if 6,
321 P.3d 235. Here, the error was obvious because the trial court arbitrarily
discounted Paul's ability to pay his debt while simultaneously ordering him to
pay it, and prejudicial because Paul is left without the ability to meet his
obligations. Even were he able to earn the income the trial court has imputed to
hiln, the trial court has left him no meanil1gful way to provide for his own needs,
debt that accrued during the 1narriage, and Tanja's alimony.
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3.1

The trial court abused its discretion when it assigned all of
the credit card debt and tax debt to Paul and yet reduced his
budget for paying the debt, making it impossible for him to
actually pay the debt

The trial court determined that Paul should pay to Tanja $700 per month in
alimony (R.122,299) using the following components:
•

Tanja' s allowed monthly expenses: $2,042.50

•

Tanja's 1nonthly net social security il1con1e: $1 1 085

•

Tanja' s monthly need: $960

•

Paul's allowed monthly expenses: $1,948

• Paul's reasonable net imputed income: $2,6665
•

Paul's ability to pay: $700

(R.116-17.)

In fact, however1 the h·ial court abused its discretion in reaching these
subsidiary numbers. A critical co1nponent of Paul's monthly expenses is his debt.
The court ordered the parties to pay all of their "own" debt. (R.118;298.) For Paul,
th_a t included credit card debt that had accrued during the marriage, all of the
taxes owing from the year 2010 when they filed their taxes "married filing
separately," and a student loan he signed for then· daughter. (R.118;298.)
At the time of trial, the uncontested minimum monthly payments on that
debt were $1,550. (R.116-17.) After remand, Paul submitted a Declaration that
indicated that the debts, in particular the interest and penalties on the Sallie Mae
5

On appeal, Paul does not raise a challenge to the court's decision to impute
income to him.
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student loan, had increased. (R.214,244.) On his original financial declaration,
Paul listed his "own" debts, as follows:
Creditor
Type of Debt
Bank of America
Bank of America
Deseret First Credit Union
Deseret FiTst Credit Union
Citi Bank/Sallie Mae
IRS
Utah State Tax Comn1'n

Visa credit card
Mastercard credit card
credit card
overdraft
daughter's student loan
2010 taxes
2010 taxes
total

Balance
8,483
9,060
1,566.17
11,744.25
14,131.85
7,949.24
3,425.07
56,360

Monthly
Payment
280
260
100
360
200
200
150
1,550

(R.102 (attached at Addendum G.)) 6

Breaking those debts into their discrete parts, Paul's debts look like this:
2010 Tax Debt (Married Filing Separate! .r)
2010 taxes
7,949.24
IRS
3,425.07
Utah State Tax Comm'n
2010 taxes
total tax debt 11,374.31
Consumer Debt Accrued During the Marriage
8,483
credit card
Bank of America
9,060
credit card
Bank of America
1,566.17
Deseret First Credit Union credit card
11,744.25
Deseret First Credit Union overdraft
30,853
total consumer debt
Student Loans for Parties' Daughter
14,131.85
Citi Bank/Sallie Mae
Combined Total Monthly Payments

200
150
350

280
260
100
360
1,000

200

1,550

(R.102.)

The trial court awarded Tanja the house and whatever payment arrangements
sh e had made with her sister. (R.112,118.) That issue is not disputed here.
6
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But even though the h·ial court ordered him to pay that debt, the trial court
essentially dismissed its financial impact when calculating Paul's monthly
expenses. The court stated: "He has listed there a $1,550 for instalhnent payments
which the court finds are not reasonable. The Court finds that a reasonable
payment on installments is $250. Certainly, it is not reasonable for almost half of
his expenses to be on installment payments, and he has some other thin.gs he
could do about that. It is more i.J.nportant that he support his wife, than to take
care of those other claims, however, the Court will allow him $250." (R.116-17.)
Paul contends that the court's arbitrarily allowing hi.J.n $250 to pay his
monthly debts rather than the $1,550 that it actually costs to pay the debt was an
abuse of discretion. First, the court did not allow Paul enough money in his
monthly budget to pay even his tax bill, let alone his credit card debt. Second, the
court assigned that debt to Paul, but did not afford him the opportunity to pay it.
Third, the court said "he has some other things he could do about that," but did
not specify what exactly that might be.
Each of these errors by itself was an abuse of the court's discretion. Paul
asks this court to reverse and conclude that Paul should have been allowed
enough in his budget to pay the debt the trial court assigned him, leaving him no
ability to pay alimony.
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3.2

The trial court failed to equalize the deficit between the
parties

The h·ial court's failure to afford Paul enough 1noney in his budget to meet
his debt burden is also an abuse of discretion because it fails to "equalize the
poverty" between the parties. "Equalization of inco1ne, which is perhaps better
described as equalization of poverty, is a trial court's remedy for those situations
in which one party does not earn enough to cover his or her demonstrated needs
and the other party does not have the ability to pay enough to cover those
needs." Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, i/39 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ,r3, 246 P.3d 173; Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292,
i/30, 242 P.3d 787. If the court does not equalize the shortfall, it should "explain
its rationale for assigning a disproportionate percentage of the shortfall to one
party." McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, i/16, 265 P.3d 839.
Recently, this court held facially inequitable a h·ial court's equalization of
income that was "not an mu·easonable approach at a theoretical level," but "[a]s
a practical matter, ... [left] Husband without the ability to meet any of his most
basic needs." Keyes, 2015 UT App 114, ,i,r39-40. There, the husband was left with
$42 "to put toward his basic needs," putting him "in a position where he has
insufficient means to sustain life on the most basic level." Id. ,r40. And although
the wife in that case was also left with a shortfall, her resources were "more than
adequate to cover her basic expenses for food and shelter." Id. This court noted
"that 'shared misery' income equalization is often based - at least in part - on a
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judge's detennination that one party or both must (and can) tighten their belts in
the face of clearly insufficient resources." Id. But, importantly, "an allocation that
on its face leaves one party with essentially no income for basic necessities
cannot be deemed equitable without further explanation by the h·ial court." Id.
As described below, the h·ial court's treatment of the parties' expenses and
inco1nes leaves Paul with no income for basic necessities.
Tanja stated that her monthly expenses were $2,585. (R.116.) The trial court
discounted those expenses by $542.50, leaving her reasonable monthly expenses
of $2,042.50. (R.116.) Tanja has disability income of $1,085, which leaves her with
a deficit of $957.50.
Paul stated that his monthly expenses were $3,677, of which $1,550 was the
1ninimum monthly payments on debt. (R.100-01.) The trial court reduced Paul's
monthly expenses by $177 for telephone, $152 for utilities, and $1,300 for
minimum monthly payments. (R.116-17.) The trial court concluded that Paul's
reasonable expenses ($3,677 -1,300 - 177 - 152) were $1,948. (R.117.) In fact, that
math contains an error: $3,677 -1,300 -177 - 152 =$2,048. The h·ial court
imputed to Paul monthly income of $2,666, which, if he actually earned it, would
leave him a surplus of $718 according to the trial court's accounting error, but in
fact leaves a surplus of $618. The trial court awarded $700 to Tanja in alimony.
The trial court's assigrunent of the debt and corresponding adjustment in
the budget leaves the parties with entirely disparate finances. Paul's debt
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payments are $1,550, regardless of the trial court's adjushnents. Allowir1g him
only $250 to pay them does nothing except artificially inflate the amount of
money he has available to support Tanja and prevent hiin from meeting his own
basic obligations.
The trial court's only justification for this disparate treatn1ent, as stated
above, was that it "is more important that he support his wife" than pay his debt.
As it was in Keyes, this distribution is facially inequitable. Additionally, leaving
Paul without enough to pay his debt forces him to accrue increasing interest and
penalties that he cannot manage.
This court should reverse the trial court's ruling, correct its n1ath, and
allow Paul the full $1,550 per month that is necessary to 1nake his payments.
With that calculation, Paul's needs are ($1,948 + 1,400) = $3,348. The trial court
imputed him incmne of $2,666, which - if he in fact were earning it - would leave
hi1n a deficit of $682.
Given that the parties both have a shortfall and that Paul has been
assigned to pay debt that amounts to $1,550 per month but has only been
allowed $250 in his budget to do so, this court should reverse the trial court's
conclusion and instead enter judgment stating that the trial court abused its
discretion and, in fact, Paul has no ability to pay alimony.
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Conclusion

Paul respectfully asks this court to reverse the trial court's conclusions and
enter a final judginent that (1) vacates the entire dissipation analysis and instead
divides the 1narital estate equally as of the date of divorce, using the corrected
numbers described in Argument 2.3; and (2) vacates the alirn.ony award because
Paul needs $1,550 in his budget to make the minimmn monthly pay1nents on his
debt and therefore has no ability to pay alimony.
Because this can be calculated as matter of law, and because Paul has
already borne the costs of appealing this matter twice, this court should eliminate
any more use of his or the judiciary' s resources and enter judgment in that
amount. No remand is necessary because no factual findings will be left and
" [n]o purpose would be served by again remanding with directions to enter
findings." Paryzelc v. Paryzelc, 776 P.2d 78, 83 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Paul respectfully asks that this court enter the final decision or remand
only for the trial court to enter an order in accordance with this court's
instructions.
DATED this 8th day of October, 2015.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC
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This is to certify that on the 8th day of October, 2015, I caused two true and
correct copies of the Brief of Appellant to be served on the following via first
class 1nail, postage prepaid:
Trevor D. Osborn
REDLAWPLLC
2909 Washington Blvd., Suite 101
Ogden, UT 84401
contact@redlawutah.com
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FILED
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MAR 20 2012

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

'j

IN THE SECO:t\lD DISTRICT COURT IN MlD FOR ·
DAV1S COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

FINDINGS OFFACT and
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

TANJA RODGERS RAYN'"ER
Petitioner,

CASE NO: 10-470-1766

vs:
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin
PAUL T. RAYN'"ER
COMJvlISSIONER: David S. Dillon
Respondent.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable
:Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by.the Commissioner to the
Distnct Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on
January 24, 20 12. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K.
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R.
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by
both parties together with other evidence received in the cause, and being fully
advised in the matter the Court makes the following:
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FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

,.,

Petitioner and Respondent are bona fide and actual residents of Davis

I •

County, State of Utah and have been for more than three (3) months immediately
prior to commencement of this action.

2.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife having been married on

:March 27, 1981 in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and both are now 54 years of
i~
1:

age.
3.

I

I

Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.78B-3-

i

Venue is proper in this Court in that Petitioner has resided for at least 90

I

i

101.

4.

f'

days or more in Davis County, Utah pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec.30-3-1(2)

-I".•

1997.
5.

The grounds upon which a divorce should be granted are irreconcilable

difference rendering the continuation of this marriage impossible; the parties have
attempted to reconcile these difference but they have been unsuccessfuJ in these
endeavors, and irreconcilable differences of the marriage are ground for divorce.
6.

The parties h ave two children as issue of the marriage, both of whom have

attained majority.
7.

Neither party should be required to maintain insurance for the benefit of the

other party.
8.

By pretrial order, the Commissioner certified for trial by the Court issues as

follows:
a. The award of equity in the marital home located at
b. The entitlement and amount of alimony to be awarded to the Petitioner
considering her n eeds, employability, and the ability of the Respondent to
,make payments of alimony based upon his historical earnings from
employment.
c. Pensions and Retirement Plans:

2
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i. The Respondent is a participant in the Deseret Mutual Plan of the
Church of Jesus Christ estimated at $30,500.
ii. The Respondent will also be entitled to receive from the Church
of Jesus Christ retirement about $867 per month.
iii. The Petitioner has an entitlement from her teacher's retirement
valued at about $11,000.
d. The accounting and allocation ofliquid marital assets.
e. The allocation ofresponsibility for marital debts.
f. The entitlement and amount of an award of attorney fees to the
Petitioner.
9.

li

· s·orne eighteen years ago the parties constructed their borne on property at
which is more particularly described as:

The Petitioner provided $9,000 from her premarital assets towards acquisition and
construction. The parties have lived separately since January, 2010. After the
separation the Respondent continued to make payments on that home through July
of 2010, and paid utilities and other items which the Court determines that he took
care of his family support obligations through July 2010. Once the Respondent
quit making the payment, the Petitioner had no ability to make those payments.

I

After a couple· of months not being paid, a foreclosure action was started and

I!

proceeded forth until Petitioner's sister rescued that home from foreclosure by

i

paying an amount of $162,884 to pay off the first mortgage, and then brought the

I

second mortgage current. Because the Petitioner had no ability to make those

'··

payments on the second mortgage, the sister has as of December, 2010 made 16
payments on that mortgage and as far as the Court can determine intends to
continue for the foreseeable future. The sister also paid the property taxes for
I

rii

2010 and 2011 as well as paid for a number of repairs and maintenance of the

!'-

i·
f
;

home including $5,500 to replace the driveway and additional $3,045.19 for other
repairs. For the amounts the sister advanced and continues to advance, the
Petitioner, as security for the loan advancements, conveyed by Special Warranty

i.

!:

3
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Deed her interest in the real property to her sister Sharree Rodgers on December
16, 2010. The parties are entitled to one half on any equity that may be in the
home, and to detennine what equity there is in the home, the Court finds that there
was an appraisal completed on October 27, 2011. The appraiser found that the
value of the home was $302,000. The Court finds that the Petitioner is entitled to
deduct from that appropriate costs of sale of approximately $21,000 that would
leave a value of $281,000. From that, the first mortgage that was satisfied by
petitioner's sister for $162,884, the second mortgage which the sister has assumed,
brought curren~ and continues to make payments has an approximate balance of
$43 ,740.

In addition, the sister has made payment for the fees to bring it current
I

i

of $9,437. As noted above, the sister has -p aid for the driveway of $5,500,

It·

additional repairs of $3,045. 19 and the taxes for the year 2010, $2,646. 88 and for

I

I.

2011, $2,851 .72. The total of the mortgage payments, the maintenance repairs and

r~
...

the t axes is $230, 104. Subtracting that from the value of $281,000 leaves a

r
r

balance as equity of $50,896. The Court finds that the home should be awarded to
the Petitioner, the home located in Bountiful. The Court finds that having an

!

indebtedness of $230,104 leaves and equity of $50,896 for consideration in

I.

division of assets.
10.

I

According to testimony, there are two remaining retirement accounts. The

Respondent bas a retirement account with Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity
1-.
I:

Plan of$30,514.08. That was the testimony and in so1I1e of the document there

r
I·

seems to be an indication that there might be another account. Ifthere is, it ought

h

to be factored in but I can't make a specific finding at this point. Also, the

,f;~

Petitioner has a retirement account of approximately $10,000. Both of these

ii'

u

1-I

..~~~
.

accounts need to be taken into consideration as it relates to \1/oodward v .

f:'
~

Woodwar4 656 P .2d 431 (Utah 1982) under which each are. entitled to an equal

~

[

i:
:-.
i

portion of those retirement accounts.
11.

iI

The parties each have incurred debt of their own. There appears to be no

i
i

joint debt other than the home. The court will order that each party pay their own

4
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debt, including, that the Respondent is to pay his tax liability for 2010 and there
after.
12.

The Respondent supported the Petitioner through July of 2010. He paid the

house payment, utilities and as far as the court can tell some other things related to
the family expenses. He also liquidated some retirement that be had in a
retirement savings account and also an IRA, some stocks; and he liquidated some

ii.7. each of the years of 2008, 2009, and 2010. The Respondent V.'orked for Oracle
Corporation until April of 2008 for an annual salary of $88,047. It was unclear to
the Court after the testimony as to whether he quit or whether he was fired for
cause; however he was terminated from his employment in April of 2008. He
initially made an attempt to find another job and then after being offered a job in
Nephi, for approximately, the testimony was $40,000 to $50,000 a year which the
Court will use the figure $40,000 a year. He decided he didn't want to move to
Nephi and so he turned that down and then as far as the Court can tell, didn't make

any other efforts to :find employment thereafter. Because he was offered a job at
$40,000 per year, and_because he has education by way of a Bachelor of Science
Degree and a Master of Science Degree in the computer field, the Court finds that
he has the ability to work regardless of the health concerns that he has, the Court
finds that he has the ability to work. He testified that he makes sometimes a few
hundred dollars a year and sometimes goes in the hole dealing in Melaleuca
products. The Court finds that is not reasonable employment, that as a result of
his education, bis ability to work, that be is underemployed. He has failed to find
a job and the Court finds that it is justified in imputing an income to the
Respondent of $40,000 a year which is the amount of the job that he turned down.
H e very well could work and earn more than that but with the evidence that the
Court has, the Court finds that the $40,000 per year as imputed income for
purposes herein.
The respondent earned an average salary for the 5 years preceding 2008,
that is 2003 through 2007 of$88,047 . With that $88,047 he was able to support

5
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himself and his wife, take care of the family expenses, take care of the debt and he
did so. In 2008, he earned $62,307 for those first few months of the year and
some oftbat, he testified was severance, but regardless for purposes of 2008,
2009, and 2010, the Court is going to find that it was reasonable that the marital
expenses would justify the amount of $88,047. In 2008, as indicated, he made
$62,307, and so he would be short of that $88,047 that was necessary to support
his family in the way they were accustomed .. He would be short $25,740. To
make up for his shortfall, however, he sold stock in the amount $105,223. He ha.s
not accounted for that. There were many documents filed and statement as to
what income and expenses were. There was much that would have taken a

J

I

forensic accountant to analyze. The Court finds this is a reasonable way to just

I
II

assume that it took $88,047, he made $62,307, it was reasonable too that he take

!

$25,740 from the stock that be sold in order to continue to support himself and his

I:

wife. He sold stock in the amount of $105,223. He needed $25,740 in order to
continue to support the family. The remainder of that retirement income $79,483
was retirement income of which each party is entitled to one half.
For 2009, the Court finds it should impute $40,000 per year income to him.
The Court did not find that for 2008 because he made more than that since he
made $62,307, but in 2009 he was not employed other than his Melaleuca which
be made a minimal amount. Thus the Court imputes $40,000 to him for 2009. In
2009 he sold stock in the amount of $37,787. He liquidated $8 1,059 interest in an
IFA for a total $118,846, thus if he needs $88,047 to support him and his wife, the
court imputes $40,000 income that he reasonably could have made. That leaves a
shortfall of $48,047. The court finds it is reasonable to subtract that amount from
the stock and the liquidated IRA of $118,846 and subtracting $48,047 that leaves
an amount $70,799 that Petitioner was entitled to one half interest in the sum of
$35,399.50.
Thus for 2008, it is $79,483 total retirement interest of which ~acb was
entitled to one half; for 2009, $70,799 is retirement interest that each was entitled

6
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to one half For the year 2010 again, the Court imputes $40,000 per year to him.

j'

He supported her for a period of seven months. Taking the previous figure of

I-

$88,047 divided by twelve times seven, then he needed for those first seven

f:

i-

r'.

[.'

months that he actually supported her and himself $5 1,360. Imputing the $40,000

i:r

l'
r

per year divided by twelve times seven then during that seven months he could

I

reasonable have earned $23,333. This leaves him a shortfall of $28,027. He has
an IRA distribution in 2010 of $65,840. Subtracting what he needed from that
distribution in order to support his fai11ily for those seven month, $28,027, from
the $65,840 leaves a balance of $37,813 of retirement income of which the

r

Petitioner is entitled to one half.

,.
,.
i

To recapitulate, for the year 2008, after the calculations of how much he

i

needed to dip into those retirement accounts in order to support the family, there
1

was left over retirement amount of $79,483. For the year 2009, there was a left

I·

over amount of $70,799. In 2010 there was an amount of$37,813. That's a total
of $116,096 that's retirement income that should be shared. Now the Court knows
that the respondent's position is he spent all of that. But the fact is that to support
the family in the way they were accustomed to be supported be did not need to
spend that. He spent a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment on
doing things that were not by way of family expenses and so regardless of it
supposedly having been spent already, the amount of retirement proceeds that
should be equally divided from those years is $116,096.
Respondent had control over that money, Petitioner has never had that. In
addition he's got his Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan of $30,514 that
needs to be figured into this. Thus we have $116,096, plus $30,514 for a total of
$146,610. Divide that by two, he owes her $73,305.
Looking at her side of the balance sheet, there is $50,896 in home equity
under her control, She also bas a retirement account of approximately $10,000 in
which he has an interest. That is a total of $60,896 divided by two she then O"l't'es
him $30,448. Subtracting $30,448 from $73,305, he then owes her $42,857. The
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Court should order that she be entitled to a QDRO to be prepared that she is
entitled to 100% of the Desert Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan $30,514.
Subtracting that from what he owes her of $42,857 that leaves a balance that he
would owe her if she takes that retirement account of the sum $12,343. The Court
should enter a judgment against him in the amount of $12,343 that he owes her for

I

the difference in his retirement and her retirement and the home equify.
13.

~

Each parry should keep the personal properfy that they have in their

possession. Each party shall retain their own bank accounts. Each parry shall pay
their own debt, and the Petitioner, because she is awarded the home she is ordered
to maintain the debt that is outstanding, that is owing to her sister and that which
she owes the bank on the second mortgage.
14.

Regarding the issues of spousal support, the Petitioner has income from

social security disability of $1,181 per month or $1,085 net. She states her
monthly expenses as $2,585. Toe Court should reduce that somewhat finding that
rent of $1,000 is not reasonable. Her actual payments are $584 per month. If in
fact she needs to be paying something on the obligation to her sister, she has
children living in the home that ought to be paying their fair share. The Court
reduces her expenses by that $4 I 6 difference. In addition the utilities that she
claims as expenses ought to be divided equally bet\veen her and her son and his
family who live with her, which should reduce another $126.50 from her
expenses. 1bis leaves a total the Court finds reasonable monthly expenses for her
of $2,042.50. She has a net income of $1,085 to offset that; therefore she bas a
need of $957.50. In addition the Court finds that $960 per month is that which she
has need of in order to meet her reasonable monthly expenses.
The Respondent as previously found is underemployed, however, the Court
has imputed his income as $40,000 per year which is $3,333 per month. The
Court finds that a reasonable net imputed income for him would be $2,666.
Regarding his expenses, he has indicated on his financial statement that his
monthly expenses are $3,677. He has listed there a $1,550 for installment

!
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payments which the Court finds are not reasonable. The Court fmds that a
reasonable payment on installments is $250. Certainly, it is not reasonable for
almost half of his expenses to be on instailment payments, and he has some other
things he could do about that. It is more important that he support his wife, than to
take care of those other claims, however, the Court will allow him $250. He also
twice counted telephone. He has a telephone expense of $100 and A TT $177.
$100 is reasonable and since that is what she is given; therefore the Court subtracts

his $177. It is also reasonable as done with the Petitioner, that only half of his
utilities be counted and subtracting from that claimed, $152. Subtracting then the
$1,300, the $177 and the $152 it results in his reasonable monthly expense of
$1,948, and he then has the ability to pay $718 alimony. This does not quite meet
the Petitioner's need, but he does not have the ability to pay more. However, at
least, he has the ability to pay $700 per month, and the Court should award
alimony to the Petitioner to be paid by the Respondent in the amount of $700 per
month to begin January 1, 2012.
15.

The Respondent has a Vested Retirement Benefit from Deseret Mutual

Master Retirement Plan under his Social Security Number

111111111 under

which if he retires at age 65, h e in May 2021, has Standard Retirement Benefit is
$866.84 per month. The Petitioner should be awarded one-half of the monthly
retirement payment, $433.42 per month as the monthly payment become due and
payable.
16.

Regarding the issue of attorney's fees, clearly the Petitioner has a need, and

she has no ability to pay attorney fees, however based on the standard that I have ·
to consider, the Respondent does not have the ability to pay her fees either. In
actuality, she perhaps could liquidate some of the $30,000 in the retirement
savings, although there would probably be a penalty. She, at least, has some
ability to pay the attorney fees and be has no ability to pay her attorney fees.
Therefore, the Court should order that each party pay their own attorney fees in
this action.
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From the foregoing Findings of Pact, the Court makes the following Conclusions
ofLaw:

1.

r

GROlJNDS. The Petitioner should be granted a Decree of Divorce on the

grounds of irreconcilable differences.
2.

REAL PROPERTY. The home property at
should be awarded to Petitioner by inclusion in the Decree of

Divorce with a legal description conveying the interest of the Respondent to the
Petitioner subject to the indebtedness assumed by the Petitioner as set forth in the
Findings of Fact.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY. Each party should be awarded the personal

property now in possession oftbe party.
4.

PENSIONS AND RETIRE1v1ENT ACCOUNTS.

r

a. The Petitioner should be awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in
the Desert Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant
to the requirement.s of the retirement plan should be executed awarding the entire
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner.
b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement
Benefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the

•

Respondent when and as payable.
c. The Petitioner should be granted judgment against Respondent for
$12,343 for the amount owed to h er in balancing the distribution of marital assets.
5.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS. The parties should each be responsible for

the debts and obligations incurred in their own names, except those owiI1g on the
real property as a result of the first and second mortgages whlch the Petitioner
should assume and discharge. The Respondent should pay his income tax
liabilities for the year 2010 and thereafter.
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6.

ALIMOl\1Y: The Petitioner should be awarded alimony in the sum of

$700.00 per month payable beginning January 1, 2012.
7.

ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent should each pay their

own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action.

Judgment should 1;,_e entered ac~ly.
DATED th.is 2fl_ day of

$

2012

BY THE COURT
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SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

By--=

IN TIIE SECOND DISTRJCT COURT IN AND FOR

r'

DAVIS COUNTY, FARlvllNGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

1·

,.
I

i'

TANJA RODGERS RAYNER
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE
CASE NO: 10-470-1766

vs:

JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin

PAUL T. RAYNER

COMMISSIONER: David S. Dillon

Respondent.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable
Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by the Commissioner to the
District Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on
January 24, 2012. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K .
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R.
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by
both parties together with other evidenc_e received in the cause and the Court
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now makes and enters
the following:
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DEGREE OF DIVORCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:

1.

FINAL DIVORCE: The Petitioner is granted a decree of divorce from the
'.

Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences of the marriage, the same
to become final upon entry.
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2.

REAL PROPERTY: The real property known as
more particularly described as

I

I
l

!

j"

i'
_ , is hereby awarded to the
Petitioner subject to encumbrances ofrecord, prior to January 24, 2012 free of any
claim of the Respondent and those claiming by, through oi- under the Respondent.
The recording of this Decree constitutes a conveyance, when recorded, vests title
to the property in the Petitioner, Tanja Rodgers Rayner.

3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: Each party is awarded the personal property

now in possession of the party.

4.

PENSIONS AND RETJRE:tvIBNT ACCOUNTS:
a. The Petitioner is awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in the

Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant
to the requirement of the retirement plan will be executed awarding the entire
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner.
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b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement
Benefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the

I

Respondent when and as payable.
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i
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c. The Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent for $12,343 for

i
!

i
I

the amount owed to her in balancing the distribution of marital assets.

!
j
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5.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties should each be responsible for

I

I
I

the debts and obligations incurred as their own debt, except those owing on the

i.

r.

real property as a result oftbe first and second mortgages which the Petitioner
should assume and discharge. Credit card debt is the obligation of the signer on
each credit card use. The Respondent shall pay his income tax liabilities for the
year 2010 and thereafter.

6.

ALIMONY: The Petitioner is awarded alimony in the sum of$700.00 per

month payable beginning January 1, 2012, by the Respondent.

7.

ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent are each to pay their

own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action.
!
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DATED this

)_o ,:;:y of
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BY THE COURT
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DISTRICT JUDGE
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IN 11-IB SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS C
STATE OF UTAH
TANJA RODGERS RAYNER

y

OCT 1

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

SUPPLEMENTAL AND AMENDED
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Petitioner,
vs.
PAUL THOMAS RAYNER

Case No. 104701766

Respondent.

Judge Michael G. Allphin

This matter is before the Court on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the entry
of more detailed findings of fact as to Respondent's employment capacity and earning potential
for purposes of imputation of income and as to Respondent's dissipation of marital assets for
purposes of the equitable division of the parties' marital estate. See Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT
App 269, ~, 15 & 23-24, 316 P.3d 455. Following the remittitur, the Court required the parties to
submit supplemental briefing on the remand issues. Having reviewed the evidence presented at
trial and the parties' arguments at trial and within their supplemental briefing, the Court now
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which supplement and amend its

i

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered on March 20, 2012:

r,

FINDINGS OF FACT

i

I

L

Respondent's employment capacity in the computer science field - employment history,
abilities, limitations, qualifications, experience, and skills
1.

In 1983, Respondent received a Bachelor of Science Degree in the field of

Computer Science from Brigham Young University.
2.

In 1989, Respondent received a Master of Science Degree in the field of

Computer Science from Brigham Young University.
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3.

Respondent's employment from 1985 through April 2008, included work as a

computer science teacher of Fortran programing and relational database theory classes at

Brigham Young University,

an on-site instructor of a 13-week relational database theory class

for Blue Cross and Blue Shield Insurance Company, a seminar instructor for Oracle Rally in the
Decus Seminars Program, and as a senior programmer for the Family History Department of the

Ii

!
i

Corporation of the President of the LDS Church, which involved being the project lead to move
the genealogical library catalog from an IMS database into a Unicode supported Oracle database

!i

•
;:

i
I

and the project lead on the design and implementation of a database to track all worldwide

!
/

contractual agreements of genealogical data.

4.

Respondent most recently worked, for approximately ten years, as a data

warehousing instructor at Oracle Corporation.

5.

While working for Oracle Corporation, Respondent was the only person in the

United States and Canada that possessed his particular skill set in computer programing and data
warehousing, which required him to travel extensively throughout the country.

6.

While working for Oracle Corporation, Respondent was regularly in-state for only

approximately 22 hours per week.
7.

On March 14, 2008, Respondent received a warning from Oracle Corporation

regarding unsatisfactory performance, which indicated that his employment could be terminated
if his performance did not immediate]y improve.

8.

In April 2008, Respondent either voluntarily left his employment at Oracle

Corporation because he believed that his medical conditions would not permit improvement in
his performance, or he was involuntarily terminated due to his unsatisfactory performance.
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9.

il
,,µ.

Respondent suffers from various permanent medical conditions, which have an

i

i

effect on his ability to maintain high-stress and rigorous empl9yment and Jimit the use of his left

I.

I·

~

hand.

H
i.

10.

i
1/

,i

Respondent's testimony that his medical conditions prevent him from any

I

continued employment in the computer science field is not credible.
Given his education, the substantial timeframe in which he was employed in the

1:
]'.
,,i:

computer science field, and the senior-level database warehousing and instructor positions he

u
q

held in the computer science field, Respondent is highly qualified, experienced, and skilled in the

:i

11.

ii

/!

11

I!

computer science field.

instructor or teacher in the computer science field following the termination of his employment

II,

at Oracle Corporation.

,.11

12.

13.

Despite his medical conditions, Respondent planned to obtain employment as an

lj

I

Respondent further acknowledged that although his efficiency has decreased, be

I

I

maintains a continued ability to use his left hand when typing on computer keyboards, and that
the existence of voice-recognition software minimalizes the consequences of his left hand's

I

i!

limitations.

14.

I

Respondent has the abilities, qualifications, experience, and skills for continued

employment in the computer science field as an instructor or teacher, or in some capacity in the
design, implementation, and maintenance of databases and data warehousing.

Respondent's earning potential - current earnings and historical earnings, prevailing
wages, and reasonable availability of jobs
15.

Respondent's annual salary was $88,047 at the time of the termination of

Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation; this was also Respondent's average annual
salary from 2003 through 2007.
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16.

Within one week after the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation,

Respondent was offered, but voluntarily declined, three full-time employment opportunities in

'

the computer science field; each of these positions had an annual salary that ranged from $40,000

i

-I

I

to $50,000.

!
i

17.

i

Respondent's attempt to later clarify that he was not actually offered the three

i
I

I

I

positions is not credible, as it conflicts with his prior testimony regarding the offers and the detail

!·

•

in which he discussed the offer from the school district in Nephi, Utah.

18.

{

The job offer Respondent received from the school district in Nephi involved the

design and maintenance of a relatively small database, _which would have been less stressful and
time-restrictive than Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation, and which would have

Ir

required only minimal maintenance.

r-

I 9.

f·

f:

r

Given that the school district's database would have been relatively small and

I

i

required only minimal maintenance, and in light of the position's annual salary, Respondent's

i
!.

travel from his Bountiful residence to Nephi would have been reasonable and his medical

i:

~
i

conditions would not have prevented the employment
20.

j·

I

The three job offers Respondent received following the termination of his

,,

employment at Oracle Corporation, and particularly the offer from the school district in Nephi,

r!
~

are illustrative of reasonably available employment opportunities that Respondent was qualified
for and had the ability to perform; the annual salaries for these positions are also illustrative of
the prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the community.

21.

Respondent also performed Internet job searches for employment in the computer

science field following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, and identified
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several available full-time positions for which he was qualified, but he voluntarily chose not to
submit applications for these positions.
22.

Given the amount oftime Respondent spent out-of-state during his employment at

Oracle Corporation, and his subsequent travel to Delaware and other states, which he
characterized as being for business purposes, Respondent' s testimony that he did not apply for
available employment opportunities in the computer science field due to their requiring his
relocation, or travel within or outside the state is not credible or reasonable.
23.

Additionally, despite the University of Utah reducing its number of teaching

positions shortly after the termination of Respondent's employment at Oracle Corporation,
Respondent was aware that part-time teaching positions in the computer science field were
available from time to time at other schools and universities, such as the University of Phoenix;
however, despite being qualified for these teaching positions and having the ability to perfonn
these types of positions, Respondent voluntarily chose not to submit any applications for the
positions.
24.

Given that Respondent planned to obtain an instructing or teaching position

following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, his· failure to submit any
applications for available teaching positions in the computer science field is not reasonable.

25.

Ultimately, Respondent voluntarily chose to_ not submit any applications for

employment in the computer science field, or any other field, after the termination of his
employment at Oracle Corporation, and voluntarily chose not to put any effort, time, or financial
resources into remaining current in his computer science expertise and training, despite having
the financial resources and ability to do so.
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26.

I:L

Respondent's decision to not remain current in his computer science expertise and

'

1:

training following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation was not reasonable

Ii
1,

given his ability for continued employment in the wmputer science filed · and the reasonable
availability ofjob opportunities of which he was aware.
27.

Rather than continuing his employment in the computer science field after the

termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, Respondent chose to focus on his
involvement with a healthcare products company, Melaleuca, Inc., which he joined in 1988.
28.

Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca consists of hls informing people about

Melaleuca's products in stores and other business establishments as the opportunities may arise
while he performs his daily tasks.
29.

When an individual that Respondent refers to the Melaleuca website joins the

company or purchases its products, Respondent receives a small commission, which varies in
amount, but is generally between $2 and $5.
30.

Respondent earns on average $200 per month from Melaleuca commissions, and

has earned approximately $18,000 from Melaleuca since he joined in 1988; Respondent also
receives a discount on the Melaleuca products and services that he purchases as a result of his
membershlp with the company.
31.

r

Given Respondent's education, work history and experience, qualifications, skills,

and his continued ability to work in the computer science field, as well as considering the
amount of income Respondent has earned from his involvement with Melaleuca and negligible
time and efforts he makes to earn these commissions, Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca
is not reasonable employment.
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32.

·:-._:-;

Respondent has not made reasonable efforts to obtain any employment since the

termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation in April 2008.
33.

Based upon Respondent's continued ability to work in the computer science field,

the reasonable availability of employment opportunities in the computer science field for which
he is qualified and has the ability to perform, Respondent's decision to decline offers for
reasonable employment in the computer science field and his failure to submit any applications
for employment following the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, and that
Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca is not reasonable employment, Respondent could be
earning more with reasonable effort and is purposefully and voluntarily underemployed.
34.

Given Respondent's voluntary underemployment, and considering Respondent's

historical income, which was $88,047 annually at the time of the termination of his employment
at Oracle Corporation, Respondent's extensive experience and qualifications in the computer
science field, that Respondent declined three job offers having annual salaries that ranged
from $40,000 to $50,000, which are illustrative of the prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community and of the reasonable availability of employment opportunities
for which Respondent was qualified for and had the ability to perform, it is appropriate and
equitable to impute an annual income of $40,000 to Respondent.

Respondent's dissipation of marital assets
35.

Respondent supported Petitioner financially through July 2010, making payments

on the parties' marital home, utilities, and other related marita.1 .expenses; throughout the parties'
marriage Petitioner also used her income to pay for daily household expenses, such as food and
clothing.
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36.

Following the tennination

of his employment at

Oracle Corporation,

in 2008, 2009, and 2010, Respondent liquidated his retirement funds, i.e., a retirement savings
account, an IRA, and stocks, to pay for the parties' marital expenses and his individual expenses.
37.

Because all of Respondent's retirement funds were accumulated over the period

of the parties' marriage, his retirement funds are marital assets of which Petitioner is entitled to a
one-half share.
38.

The parties failed to present sufficient evidence to pennit a calculation of the

exact amount of their monthly marital expenses in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
39.

However, for the five years preceding the termination of his employment at

Oracle Corporation, Respondent earned an average annual salary of $88,047, which was
sufficient to support himself and Petitioner and to pay for the parties' marital expenses and debts.
40.

Indeed, Respondent testified that prior to the termination of his employment at

Oracle Corporation, the parties' monthly marital expenses were between $5,000 and $6,000,
which is consistent with Petitioner's testimony that Respondent told her, and she believed,
that $60,000 was the amount needed to support their lifestyle.

4I.

Given that the parties historical expenditures and that they did not take on any

significant new marital expenses or debts following the termination of Respondent's
employment at Oracle Corporation, it is reasonable to infer that $88,047 annually was a
sufficient amount to support Petitioner and Respondent and to pay for their marital expenses and
debts in 2008, 2009, and 2010.
42.

Even considering the additional $16,000 debt resulting from Respondent's

purchase of a vehicle for the parties' daughter, Respondent's testimony that the parties' marital
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expenses rose to $10,000 per month following the termination of his employment at Oracle

i

I
!

Corporation is not credible and is not supported by corroborating documentation.

43 . . • In- 2008, prior to the termination of his employment at Oracle Corporation, ,
Respondent earned $62,307, which includes his severance pay.
i

44.

Considering $88,047 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for

!

their marital expenses and debts in 2008, Respondent's actual 2008 income left a shortfall

~;

r.

i'

In 2008, Respondent liquidated $105,223 of his stock, an amount that is $79,483

greater than the shortfall needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and

i

I

i
I
!

l

i[:

debts in 2008.

46.

I

!

r

of $25,740 for 2008.

45.

r

I

Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds

in 2008, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $79,483 for 2008.

47.

Using

$40,000

as

Respondent's

imputed

income

for

2009,

and

considering $88,047 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital
expenses and debts in 2009, there was a shortfall of $48,047 for 2009.

48.

In 2009, Respondent liquidated $37,787 of his stock and $81,059 from his IRA,

for a total of $118,846, an amount that is $70,799 greater than the shortfall needed to support the

I
1:

parties and to pay for their marital expenses and debts in 2009.

49.

Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds

in 2009, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $70,799 for 2009.
50.

For 2010, Respondent supported Petitioner and paid for the parties' material

expenses and debts for only the first seven months of the year; therefore, it is appropriate to
reduce the $88,047 needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and debts
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by the percentage ohime that Respondent actually provided family support in 2010, i.e., seven
divided by twelve multiplied by $88,047, an amount that totals approximately $51,360.

,,

'·

51.

i

By reducing Respondent's $40,000 imputed income for 2010 by the percentage of

I

time that Respondent actually provided family support in 2010, i.e., seven divided by twelve

r

multiplied by $40,000, Respondent should have earned approximately $23,333 in the first seven
months of 2010.
52.

Using $23,333 as Respondent's imputed income for the first seven months

of 2010, and considering $51,360 as the amount needed to support the parties and to pay for their
marital expenses and debts for the first seven months of 2010, there was a shortfall of $28,027

:

for 2010.
53.

,,i::

[:

In 2010, Respondent liquidated $65,840 from his IRA, an amount that is $37,813

i'

i

greater than the shortfall needed to support the parties and to pay for their marital expenses and

f

debts in 2010.
54.

Given the excess amount that Respondent liquidated from his retirement funds

F

rI.
!

in 2010, there is an apparent dissipation of marital assets in the amount of $37,813 for 2010.

!-

I

55.

The total amount of

and 2010 is $188,095.

i

the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009,

!
i

i:

1

i·
,,
i,

56.

Because Respondent., and not Petitioner, had control over the amount that he

liquidated from his retirement funds in 2008, 2009, and 2010, and because Respondent, and not
Petitioner, bad primary control over and access to the liquidated retirement funds, it is

1 In its March 20, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court made a mathematical error when it
calculated $116,096 as the total amount of the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010.
Accordingly, the Court amends its prior Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to reflect the correction of this
clerical error and the use of the incorrect figure in the Court's subsequent calculations relating to the equitable
division of the parties' marital estate. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60{a).
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appropriate and equitable to attribute the apparent dissipation of marital assets for 2008, 2009,
and 20 IO to Respondent
i

57.

I

Respondent's testimony that it was Petiti'6ner that dissipated these marital assets

I·

!

is not supported by the financial documentation and is not credible given that be had primary
control over and access to the liquidated retirement funds.
58.

With the exception of $16,000 spent on the purchase of a vehicle for the parties'

daughter, which Petitioner agreed to insofar as she believed that the purchase of a vehicle for

I
I
/
f.

their daughter was appropriate, Respondent has failed to present sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that the apparent $188,095 of dissipated marital assets were actually used for some
legitimate marital purpose.

I

i·
!

59.

While there is insufficient evidence to show exactly how and where all of

Respondent's liquidated retirement funds were spent, the financial documentation demonstrates

V

i

r

i

!

that:

•

In November 2009 and April 2010, Respondent wrote checks totaling
$1, I 00 to Richard Mathis;

•

In March 2010, Respondent purchased three season passes to Cedar
Point, an amusement park in Sandusky, Ohio, for Respondent, the
parties' daughter, and Mr. Mathis, which totaled $399;

•

From January 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $3,215.68
on adult entertainment, including viewing potnography via the Internet
and television, and frequenting private men's bathhouses, hotels, and
adult themed boutiques and stores;

•

From May 2008 through May 2010, Respondent spent $498 for legal
services from ARAG Legal Services;

•

From January 2008 through August 2010, Respondent made
$19,743.51 in purchases ofMelaleuca products and services; and

•

From April 2008 through July 2010, Respondent spent $14,077.97
while traveling to locations, including as Delaware, Pennsylvania,
Nevada, and California
Page 11
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60.

These expenditures, which Respondent made from his liquidated retirement

funds, were not used for legitimate marital purposes and are illustrative of Respondent's

1'

dissipation of the parties' marital assets for his personal expenses that were above and beyond
that of the parties' historical expenditures.

61.

Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds

on Mr. Mathis were for the purpose of repaying loans that he used to pay marital expenses and

I

debts is not credible nor is it supported by corroborating documentation.

,·

62.

Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds

I,

for adult entertainment should be construed as being for legitimate marital purposes and were
consistent with the parties' historical expenditures is not reasonable nor is it supported by
corroborating documentation.
63.

Respondent's testimony that the amount of his expenditures of the liquidated

retirement funds on Melaleuca products and services was consistent with the parties' historical
expenditures is not credible nor supported by corroborating documentation.

64.

Respondent's testimony that his expenditures of the liquidated retirement funds

while traveling should be construed as being for a legitimate marital purpose, i.e., business
expenses, is not credible, as the primary purpose for Respondent's 11:'avel was for personal

,,

.II
d
:,

·;
Ii

entertainment, such as spending time with Mr. Mathis or for adult entertainment, and as
Respondent's involvement with Melaleuca was not reasonable employment.

65.

Given that Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds on his personal

expenses, and not for legitimate marital purposes, that these expenditures were not consistent
with the parties' historical practices, that the dissipated marital assets comprise a substantial
amount of the parties' marital estate, that Respondent had primary control over and access to the
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liquidated retirement funds, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient documentation to
precisely account for how and where the liquidated retirement funds were spent, it is appropriate
and equitable to hold Respondent·accountable for the entire amount of the dissipated marital
assets.
66.

Subtracting the $16,000 spent on the purchase of a vehicle for the parties'

daughter from the amount of the apparent dissipation of marital assets, $188,095, Respondent is

i
l.

accoW1table for $172,095 in dissipated marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010.

~

I'

I·
67.

In determining the appropriate division of the parties' marital estate, Respondent

j

I
has $172,095 in dissipated marital assets and $30,514 from his Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered
1-

[

Annuity Plan on his side of the balance sheet, which totals $202,609; dividing $202,609 by two

~
~

~

results in Respondent owing Petitioner $101 ,304.50.
68.

t

On Petitioner's side of the balance sheet, she has $50,896 from equity in the

parties' marital home and $10,000 from her retirement account, which totals $60,896;
dividing $60,986 by two results in Petitioner owing Respondent $30,448.
69.

By subtracting the $30,448

that Petitioner owes

to

Respondent from

the $101,304.50 that Respondent owes to Petitioner, there is a total of $70,856.50 that
Respondent owes to Petitioner.
70.

It is, therefore, appropriate and equitable that a QDRO be prepared entitling

Petitioner to 100% of Respondent's Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Pl~ $30,514, which
leaves a balance of $40,342.50 that Respondent owes to Petitioner.
71.

Accordingly, it is appropriate and equitable that judgment be entered against

Respondent and in favor of Petitioner in the amolli1t of$40,342.50.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent's voluntary underemployment
1.

Considering Respondent's employment capacity

and employment · potential,

Respondent has been voluntarily underemployed since the termination of his employment at
Oracle Corporation in April 2008. See Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ~~ 21-23, 272
P.3d 748; see also Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Imputation of income to Respondent

2.

Given

Respondent's

voluntary

underemployment,

and

considering

hls

employment potential, probable earnings, prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds
in the commun..ity, and the reasonable availability of employment opportunities for whlch
Respondent is qualified and has the ability to perform, it is appropriate to impute an annual
income of $40,000 to Respondent. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7).

Inclusion of dissipated marital assets in valuation of marital property
3.

Considering the historical amount necessary to support the parties and to pay for

their marital expenses and debt, and the amount of the retirement funds that Respondent
liquidated, there is an apparent dissipation of martial assets in the amount of $188,095
for 2008, 2009, and 2010.

4.

Considering that Respondent had primary control over and access to the

liquidated retirement funds, it is appropriate and equitable to attribute the apparent dissipation of

R
::..

marital assets for 2008, 2009, and 2010 to Respondent.

5.

Considering how Respondent spent the liquidated retirement funds, i.e., that

Respondent used the funds for his personal expenses rather than legitimate marital purposes, the
parties' historical practices and expenditures, the magnitude of the depletion in relation to the
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l"'
size of the marital estate, and that Respondent failed to submit sufficient documentation to
account for how and where the funds were spent, it is appropriate and equitable to hold
Respondent accountable for the upper limit of the dissipated marital assets. See Goggin v. ·

Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i~ 49 & 53, 299 P.3d 1079; see also Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT
App 30, ~ 15,996 P.2d 565; Shepherdv. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429,433 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

6.

Petitioner is entitled to a credit for her one-half share of the marital assets that

I
1.

j:;

Respondent dissipated. See Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i,i 49 & 53.
7.

i

It is appropriate and equitable that a QDRO be prepared entitling Petitioner

to 100% of Respondent's Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan.

8.

It is appropriate and equitable that judgment be entered against Respondent and in

favor of Petitioner in the amount of $40,342.50.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court' s March 20, 2012
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are supplemented and amended.
The Court directs Petitioner to prepare and submit an Amended Decree of Divorce that
incorporates and is consistent with the Court's March 20, 2012 Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and these Supplemental and Amended Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

l

2DL-L-4-)1_

Dated: ---1->--<l0'----1-'-'-·
0--'-'==='"
·
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I
I

l'

I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL

l·

i

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER, postage pre-paid, to
the following on this date:

i
I

\O \ \C) \\\-\

/.

George K. Fadel
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010

I
i

rr

John M. Webster
Matthew A. Bartlett
BARTLETT & WEBSTER
5093 South 1500 West
Riverdale, Utah 84405

I

I

1
I

i

I
l:.

t;

I·

i
I
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FILED
JAN 2 6 2015

GEORGE K. FADEL #1027
Attorney for Petitioner
170 West 400 South
Bountiful, Utah 84010
(801) 295-2421
Facsimile: (80 l) 294-7787

SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AJ\TD FOR
DAVIS COUNTY, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STA TE OF UTAH

TANJA RODGERS RAYNER

A.MENDED
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
CASENO: 10-470-1766
vs:
JUDGE: Michael G. Allphin
PAUL T. RAYNER
COMMISSIONER: David S. Dillon
Respondent.

The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial before the Honorable
Michael G. Allphin, District Judge after certification by the Commissioner to the
District Court Judge, on December 28, 2011, and continued for further hearing on
January 24, 2012. The Petitioner appeared in person and by Attorney George K.
Fadel, and the Respondent appeared in person and by Attorney Steven R.
Lawrence, Jr., at both of said hearings. The Court heard testimony provided by
both parties together with other evidence received in the cause and the Court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

1.
I

i

'·· -· - • · - ' · • ·

•. •

•

~ ~; ;J

·-= ~.....,_

r

The Court, on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals for the entry of more

i

!
detailed findings of fact as to Respondent's employment capacity and earning
potential for purposes of imputation of income and as to Respondent's dissipation
of marital assets for purposes of the equitable division of the parties' marital estate

see Raynerv. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ~115 & 23-24, 316 P.3d 455, required

j
I

i

!

i

i

the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the remand issues. Having reviewed

•
I

the evidence presented at trial and the parties' arguments at trial and within their

I

supplemental briefing, the Court entered Supplemental and AMENDED Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which supplement and amend its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of law entered on March 20, 2012.
The Court now makes and enters the following:

AMENDED DEGREE OF DIVORCE

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED:
1.

FINAL DIVORCE: The Petitioner was granted a decree of divorce from the

Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences of the marriage, the same
to become final upon entry, on March 20, 2012.
2.

REAL PROPERTY: The real property known as
more particularly described as

, is hereby awarded to the
Petitioner subject to encumbrances of record, prior to January 24, 2012 free of any

2

'.

\ •••• • •• • ~.

• . •• • •

--··

-·L.. . .... . : - •• - - · · · · · · · · · · · -· · · \ -·

µ
i
i
i

claim of the Respondent and those claiming by, through or under the Respondent.
The recording of this Decree constitutes a conveyance, when recorded, vests title to
the property in the Petitioner, Tanja Rodgers Rayner.
3.

PERSONAL PROPERTY: Each party is awarded the personal property in
I

i

possession of the party on March 20, 20 12.
4.

I

!.
j.

PENSIONS AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS:

k
~

,,
a. The Petitioner is awarded all of the interest of the Respondent in the

t-·

I

Deseret Mutual Tax Sheltered Annuity Plan for the Church of Jesus Christ
retirement fund of about $30,500. A Qualified Domestic Relations Order pursuant
to the requirement of the retirement plan will be executed awarding the entire
interest of the Respondent in said plan to the Petitioner.
b. The Petitioner is awarded a one-half interest in the Vested Retirement
B~nefit in the Deseret Mutual Master Retirement Plan now in the name of the
Respondent when and as payable.
c. The Petitioner is granted judgment against Respondent for $40,342.50 for
the amount owed to her in balancing the distribution of marital assets.

I
i·
I

I

5.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS: The parties should each be responsible for

the debts and obligations incurred as their own debt, except those owing on the real
property as a result of the first and second mortgages which the Petitioner should
assume and discharge. Credit card debt is the obligation of the signer on each
credit card use. The Respondent shall pay his income tax liabilities for the year
2010 and thereafter.
3

!.

~- -.- .(

.
i

L
~
I
I

I

6.

ALIMONY: The Petitioner is awarded alimony in the sum of $700.00 per

month payable beginning January 1, 2012, by the Respondent.
7.

I

I

ATTORNEYS FEES: The Petitioner and Respondent are each to pay their

own attorney's fees and costs incurred in this action.

I
I

I

•
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Tab E

§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of... , UT ST § 30-3-5

KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Trcaunent
Proposed Legislation

\Vest's Utah Code Annotated
Title 30. Husband and \Vife
Chapter 3. Divorce (Refs & Annos)
U.C.A. 1953 § 30-3-5
§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of parties and
c.hildren--Division of debts--Comt to have continuingjurisdiction--Custody and
parent-time--Determination of alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification

Currentness
(J ) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders re lating to the children, property, debts
or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:

(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of the
dependent children including responsibility for heal th insurance out-of-pocket expenses such as co-payments, co-insurance,
and deductibles;

(b)(i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate
health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and

(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, hospital, or dental
insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 which will take effect if at any time a
dependent child is covered by both parents' health , hospital, or dental insurance plans;

(c) pursuant to Section l 5-4-6.5:

(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;

(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts,
obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;

(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11 , Recovery Services; and

-=

- - -- ------ --- ·---- -----
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§ 30 -3-5. Disposi tion of property--Maintenance and health care of... , UT ST § 30-3-5

(e) if either pa1ty owns a life insurance policy or an annuity contract, an acknowledgment by the court that the owner:

(i) bas reviewed and updated, where appropriate, the list of beneficiaries;

(ii) has affirmed that those listed as beneficiaries are in fact the intended beneficiaries after the divorce becomes final; and

(iii) understands that if no changes are made to the policy or contract, the beneficiaries currently listed will receive any
funds paid by the insurance company under the terms of the policy or contract.

(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion
of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial
parent. lfthe court detennines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared
for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, necessitated by
the employment or training of the custodial parent.

(3) The court bas continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable
and necessary.

(4) Child support, cusiody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and father after entry of the decree
of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.

(5)(a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interest of the child.

(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an order
establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to enforce a
court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under this chapter.

(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court shall
order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, iftbe court determines
that the petition was without meri t and not asserted or defended against in good faith.

(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a grandparent or other
member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of
the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time.

(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:

-----··---- ·--·-----~---------------------
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§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of... , UT ST§ 30-3 -5

(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;

(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income;

(iii) the ability oftbe payor spouse to provide support;

(iv) the length oftbe maniage;

(v) whether the recipient spouse bas custody of minor children requiring support;

(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and

(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by paying for education
received by the payor spouse or enabling the payor spouse to attend school duril1g the maniage.

(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining whether to award alimony and the terms thereof.

(c) "Fault" means any of the following wrongful conduct during the marriage that substantially contributed to the break.'11p
of the maniage relationship:

(i) engaging in sexual relations with a person other than the party's spouse;

(ii) knowingly and intentionally causing or attempting to cause physical harm to the other party or minor children;

(iii) knowingly and intentionally causing the other party or minor children to reasonably fear life-threatening harm; or

(iv) substantially undermining the financial stability oftbe other party or the minor children.

(d) The court may, when fault is at issue, close the proceedings and seal the court records.

(e) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard ofliving, existing at the time of separation, in detennining alimony
in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shaU consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may,
in its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In maniages of short duration, when
no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at
the time of the maniage.

(f) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective standards of living.

- ----- ···- - ----- - ------
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§ 30 -3-5. Disposition of property--Mainten ance and health ca re of..., UT ST§ 30-3-5

(g) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of one of ibe spouses
due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital property and in determining the
amount of alimony. lf one spouse's earning capacity bas been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during
the marriage, the cow1 may make a compensating adjustment in dividing the mari tal property and awarding alimony.

(h) In detem1ining al imony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been conceived or born duri ng
the marriage, the cow1 may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at the time of the marriage.

(i)(i) The cow1 has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a
substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(ii) The court may not modify a limony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist
at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify that action.

(iii) In detem1ining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be considered, except as provided
in this Subsection (8).

(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses.

(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct
justifies that consideration.

(j) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage ex isted un less, at any time
prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer
period of time.

(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. However, iftbe remarriage is annulled and found
to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment
and the payor party's rights are determined.

(I 0) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon establishment by the party paying
alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person.

Credits
Laws 1909, c. 109, § 4; Laws 1969, c. 72, § 3; Laws 1975, c. 81, § I ; Laws 1979, c. 110, § l ; Laws 1984, c. 13, § l ; Laws
1985, c. 72, § 1; Laws 1985, c. 100, § 1; Laws 199 1, c. 257, § 4; Laws 1993, c. 152, § I; Laws 1993, c. 26 1, § 1; Laws 1994,
c. 284, § l; Laws 1995, c. 330, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 232, § 4, eff. July 1, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 168, § I, eff.
May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 277, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 255, § 4, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2003, c. 176, § 3,
eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2005, c. 129, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005; Laws 20 10, c. 285, § I, eff. May 11 , 201 0; Laws 2013, c. 264, §
I, eff. May 14, 2013; Laws 2013, c. 373, § I , eff. May 14, 2013.

Ne:-:.t § 2015 Thomson Reuters. 1-.Jo c:airn to original U.S. Government 'Norks.

4

§ 30-3-5. Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care of... , UT ST§ 30-3-5

Codifications R.S. 1898, § 1212; C.L. 1907, § 12 12; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. l 933, § 40-3-5; C. 1943, § 40-3-5.

Notes of Decisions (1479)
. _UC.A. 1953 § 30-3-5, :UT ST§ 30-3-5
.
-..
Current through 2015 First Special Session

.;-
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§ 78B -12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 78B -12-2 03

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 78b. Judicial Code
Chapter 12. Utah Child Support Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 2. Calculation and Adjustment
U.C.A. 1953 § 78B-12-203
Formerly cited as UT ST §78-45-7.5
§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--Imputed income

Currentness
(I) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes prospective income from any source, including earned and nonearned
income sources which may include salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone, prizes, dividends,
severance pay, pensions, inierest, trust income, -alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, Social Security
benefits, workers' compensation ben.efits, unemployment compensation, income replacement disability insurance benefits, and
payments from "nonmeans-tested" government programs.

(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job. If and only if during the time
prior to the miginal support order, the parent normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at the parent's job, the court
may consider this extra time as a pattern in calculating the parent's ability to provide child support.

(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (I), specifically excluded from gross income are:

(a) cash assistance provided under T itle 35A, Chapter 3, Part 3, Fami ly Employment Program;

(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security Income,
Social Security D isability Insurance, Medicaid, SNAP benefits, or General Assistance; and

(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent.

(4)(a) Gross income from self-employmen t or operation of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses
required for self-employment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy
a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted
from gross receipts.

(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business income determined for tax
purposes.

(5)(a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual basis and then recalculated to determine the average
gross monthly income.

··-··-
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§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 788 -12-203

(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer
statements and complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the court finds the verification is
not reasonably available. Verification of income from records maintained by the Department of Worl--force Services may be
substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns.

(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an underemployment or overemployment situation
exists.

(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection (7).

(7)(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed, the parent defaults, OL in
contested cases, a hearing is held and the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative proceeding
enters findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for tl1e imputation.

(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential and probable earnings as derived
from employment opportunities, work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community, or the median earning for persons in the same occupation in the same geographical area as
found in the statistics maintained by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

(c) If a parent has no recent work history or a parent's occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal
minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding
officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.

(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist and ilie condition is not of a temporary nature:

(i) ilie reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children approach or equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;

(ii) a parent is physically or mentally unable to earn minimum wage;

(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills; or

(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.

(8)(a) Gross income may not include tbe earnings of a minor child who is fue subject of a child support award nor benefits to
a minor child in the child's own right such as Supplemental Security Income.

\' •:"-~-ct=•. N:·;:.t © 2015 Thomson Reu\ei S. No ciairn to origin2I U.S. G O\'e i·nrnsnt Works.
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§ 78B-12-203. Determination of gross income--lmputed income, UT ST§ 788-12-203

(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support to the parent
upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting tbe amount against the potential obligation of that parent. Other unearned
income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § I 245, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2012, c. 41 , § 13, eff. May 8, 2012.

Notes of Decisions (68)
UC.A. 1953 § 78B- l 2-203, UT ST§ 78B-l 2-203
Current through 2015 First Special Session
End of Document
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Rayner v. Rayner, 316 P.3d 455 (2013)

750 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 2013 UT App 269

BACKGROUND

316 P.3d 455
Court of Appeals of Utah.

,i 2 Tanja Rodgers Rayner (Wife) and Husband were married

Tanja Rodgers RAYNER, Petitioner and Appellee,
V.

Paul Thomas

R.t,,.YNER, Respondent and Appellant.

No. 20120307-CA

Nov. 15, 2013.

Synopsis
Background: Wife filed a petition for divorce. The Second

District Court, Farmington Depanrnent, Michael G. Allphin,
J., distributed property, awarded wife atimooy, and granted
the divorce. Husband appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Christiansen, J., held that:

[l) the Court of Appeals was unable to review husband's
appellate argument that alleged the trial court erred when it
found he was voluntarily underemployed and imputed income

in 1981. They separated nearly thirty years later in January
20 I 0, and Wife filed a petition for divorce later that year.
Husband had lost his job in April 2008. After losi_ng his job,
he received only minimal income working with a mu lti-level
marketing firm. H owever, Husband and Wife had stock and
multiple retirement accounts, and Husband began liquidating
some of these assets after he lost his job and continued to do
so during the parties' separation.
,i 3 After a bench trial, the trial court found Husband to
be underemployed and imputed to him an annual income
of S40,000. The trial court· also found that Husband had
dissipated the parties' assets, spending SI I 6,096 "on himself'

during 2008, 2009, and 2010. 1 The imputed income and
the dissipated assets factored into the trial court's ultimate
alimony award and property distribution that accompanied
the decree of divorce.

to husband, and
[2) the Court of Appeals was unable to review husband's
app ellate argument that alleged the trial court erred when it
found be bad dissipated marital assets.

Reversed and remanded.
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Opinion

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:

,i 1 Paul Thomas Rayner (Husband) appeals the trial court's
decree of divorce, challenging the trial court's property
distribution and alimony award. We reverse and remand.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

r11

[2)

(3)

,i 4 On appeal, Husband contends that the

trial court exceeded its discretion by misapplying the law
and that its findings of underemployment and dissipation
are not supported by the evidence. "The trial court *458
in a divorce action is permitted considerable discretion in
adjusting the financial and property interests of the parties,
and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validi ty."
Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT J6, "ii 44,299 P.3d J079 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). However, we will
reverse if"( J) there was a misunderstanding or misapplication
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2)
the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; or (3)
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear
abuse of discretion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). Furthermore, "we cannot affirm its determination
when the trial court abuses its discretion" by failing to
enter "specific, detailed findings supporting its financial
determinations." Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 101 8, 1021 (Utah
Ct.App.1993 ).

ANALYSIS
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I. Imputed Income

undc-:remployed." Jd. ~ 16 (alteration in original) (citation and
additional internal quotation marks omitted).

1_4) ~ 5 Husband first contends that the trial court's finding ~ 8 lo Busche, we recen tly explained what is required under
of voluntary underemployment was unsupported by the
the first step of the imputation analysis to support a finding
evidence. The trial court stated that the evidence concerning
of voluntary u.nderemployment fo llowing the loss ofajob. lf
the trial court detem1ines that a spouse has been involuntarily
whether Husband quit or was fired for cause was u.nclear.
tem1inated, the trial court "must then consider what the
Therefore, the trial court's finding of underemployment
[spouse) has done in the aftermath of termination to determine
focused oo Husband's actions after losing his job. The trial
court fouod that at the time his job ended io April 2008,
whether he or she has become voluntarily underemployed
by virtue of his or her failure to theo make reasonable
Husband had an aonual salary of about S88,000. Husband
efforts to obtain employment at a pay rate comparable
"initially made an attempt to fiod another j ob." He was
to that of the lost employment." Id. ~ 21. In addition to
"offered a job" in Nephi for about $40,000 a year, but "he
turned that down" because "he didn't want to move" from bis
considering the spouse's efforts, the trial court must consider
the spouse's "employment capacity and earnings potential."
home in Bountiful. After his initial efforts, Husband "didn't
Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1026 (Utah Ct.App.1993).
make any other efforts to find employment." The trial court
Employment capacity *459 involves consideration of the
also found that Husband "has the ability to work regardless
spouse's abilities and limitations, qualifications, experience,
of the health concerns that be has." The trial court found that
and skills. Busche, 20 12 UT App 16, ,1,J21-22, 272 P.3d 748;
the "few hundred dollars a year" that Husband made from
Hall, 858 P.2d at 1026. An earning potential detem1ination
bis multi-level marketing work-"and sometimes go [iog) in
involves comparison of the spouse's current earnings with
the hole"--did oot qualify as reasonable employment. Based
or her historical income, "the prevailing wages for a
on Husband's education and abi lity, aod the availability of
person with his or her qualifications" and consideration of
the job in Nephi, the trial court concluded that Husband was
underemployed.
whether there are jobs reasonably avai lable "in the relevant
market for a person with the party's qualifications and
ii 6 Husband argues that no evidence supports these findings.
experience." Busche, 2012 UT App 16, ~~ 21-23, 272 P.3d
748; Hall, 858 P .2d at 1026. In sum, "a finding of volunta1y
He argues that the uncontroverted evidence instead requires
the conclusion that be was fired for cause, that he was not
underemployment must be based on evidence that the party
actually offered the job in Nephi, that moving or commuting
could be earning more with reasonable effort." Busche, 2012
UT App 16, ~ 22, 272 P.3d 748.
to Nephi was oot an option, that his numerous health problems

ms

prevent him from working a rigorous schedule or using his
left hand, and that his multi-level marketing work provided a
viable source of income given his health restrictions.

[7) ~ 9 "Should the court determine that the petitioner
is indeed voluntarily underemployed and that imputation is
appropriate under the circumstances, it may then proceed to
[5)
[6) ~ 7 "When determining the appropriate amount of refine the analysis to arrive at a specific amount of income to
alimony, a trial court must make findings as to 'the ability
be imputed." Jd. ii 23. Under this second step of the analysis,
the trial court must consider the folJowiog statutory factors,
of the payor spouse to provide support.' "Fish v. Fish, 20 JO
UT App 292, ~ 14, 242 P.3d 787 (quoting Utah Code Ann. §
which "closely align" with the analysis uoder the first step:
30- 3- 5(8)(a)(iii) (LexisNexis Supp.2010)). "In doing so, '[a)
If income is imputed to a
court may impute income to an underemployed spouse.' "Id.
[spouse), the income shall be
(alteration in original) (quoting Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT
based
upon employment potential
App 139, ~ 16,233 P.3d 836). " [T)he imputation analysis ...
and
probable
earnings as derived
involves determining whether the [spouse) is voluntarily
from employment opportunities, work
unemployed or underemployed and, if so, how much income
history,
occupation qualifications,
ought to be imputed." Busche v. Busche, 20 12 UT App 16,
and
prevailing
earnings for persons
~ l 3, 272 P.3d 748. A spouse is " 'voluntarily uoemployed
of similar backgrounds m the
or underemployed' when [he or she) intentionally chooses
community, or the median earning for
of his or her own free will to become unemployed or
persons in the same occupation in the
same geographical area as found in the
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statistics maintained by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.

[10]
fll] [12) [13] ,i 11 "Findings are adequate only if
they are sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary
2
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(b) (LexisNexis 2012).
on each factual issue was reached." Hall, 858 P .2d at J02 J
I8] [9] ,i IO The Utah Code states that in contested cases, (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord Fish,
2010 UT App 292, ,i 20, 242 P.3d 787. 'T he trial court's
"[i]ncome may not be imputed to a [spouse] unless ... a
decision to impute income may nonetheless be affirmed if
bearing is held and the judge ... enters findings of fact as
the failure to have made the missing findings can be viewed
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation." Id. § 78B-J 2as hamlless error." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025. "One method
203(7)(a). This statute was amended in 2007 and renumbered
is to show that the undisputed evidence clearly establishes
3
in 2008. The prior version stated that in contested cases,
tbe
factor or factors on which findings are missing." Id.
"[i]ncome may not be imputed to a [spouse] unless ... a
( citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
hearing is held and a finding made that the [spouse) is
Mancil, 2000 UT App 378, ,i 21 , 18 P.3d 509 (concluding
voluntari ly unemployed or underemployed." Id. § 78-45that
specific findings on the statutory imputation factors
7.5(7)(a) (Supp.2006). 4 By replacing the language requiring
were not necessary when the evidence was not in dispute).
"a finding :.. that the [spouse] is voluntari ly unemployed
"Furthermore, even given controverted evidence, we could
or underemployed," id., with lanwa2e
requirino0 the J·udoe
.::,
._,
.::,,
affirm the trial court's decision to impute income, absent
to "enter[ ] fmdings of fact as to the evidentiary basis for
outright expression of the statutorily mandated finding. if
the imputation," id. § 78B-l2-203(7)(a) (2012), we read
the absent findings can reasonably be implied." Hall, ~858
the statute as emphasizing the detailed findings of fact
P.2d at 1025. "Unstated findings can be implied if it is
necessary to support a decision to impute income, as well
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually considered
as implicitly recognizing that whether a party is voluntarily
the controverted evidence and necessari ly made a finding to
underemployed or unemployed is really an ultimate fact
resolve the controversy, but simply failed to record the factual
or a legal conclusion which turns on the subsidiary facts
determination it made." Id.; see Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75
found by tl1e trial court. "Imputation is troubling when the
~
I 5, 984 P.2d 987 (determining that some of the staruto;
obligor is charged with obligations that he may not be
factors required in the imputation analysis were "necessarily
able to pay, even with the best of efforts." Busche, 2012
implied" by the evidence). "Findings may not be implied,
UT App 16, ,i 17, 272 P.3d 748 (citation and internal
however, wben the ambiguity of tbe facts makes such an
quotation marks omitted). Indeed, in the alimony context,
assumption unreasonable." Hall, 858 P.2d at 1025 (citation
the imputation analysis is a component of determining the
and internal quotation marks omitted). For example, "we will
obligor's ability to pay and the recipient spouse's ability to
not imply any missing finding where there is a matrix of
support himself or herself. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, ,i,i 14,
possible factual findings and we cannot ascertain the trial
22, 242 P.3d 787; *460 Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547,
court's actual findings." Id. at I 025-26 (citation and internal
554 (Utah Ct.App.1993 ). Imputation "cannot be premised
quotation marks omitted).
upon mere conjecture; instead, it demands a careful and
precise assessment requiring detailed findings." Willey, 866
,i 12 Husband argues both that the evidence was insufficient
P.2d at 554. Therefore, the trial court must enter not just a
to support the underemployment determination and that the
finding of voluntary unemployment or underemp loyment but
trial court abused its discretion by disregarding the imputation
specific, detailed findings "as to the evideotiary basis for the
analysis required by Busche and the statute. However, we are
imputation," Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(7)(a). See Fish,
unable to review Husband's arguments due to the inadequacy
20 IO UT App 292, ,i,i 20, 22, 242 P.3d 787 (remanding for
of the trial court's findings. " '[W]here the inadequacy of the
additional findings on whether income should be imputed
trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law results in
and bow much); Willey, 866 P.2d at 554 (same); Hall, 858
our inability to ascertain the basis of the trial court's decision
P.2d at 1024-27 (same). But see Mancil v. Smi1h, 2000 UT
[we are] prevented from effectively reviewing the trial court';
App 3 78, ,ii] 20-21, 18 P.3d 509 (stating, in considering the
decision and may remand for the entry of more-detailed
prior version of the statute, that requiring the trial court to
findings.'" Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App J 62, ~ 42, 280
make "explicit findings on each of the factors" "is too strict"
P .3d 425 (second alteration in original) (quoting Interstate
a reading of the statute, at least when the findings can be
necessarily implied or are based on undisputed evidence).

-
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Income Props., Inc. v. la Jolla Loans, Inc., 20 11 UT App l 88,
,i J 2, 257 P.3d l 073). We fol low that course here.

,i 13 \\le cannot say that "the undisputed evidence clearly
establishes the factor or factors on wbjch findings are
missing." See Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1025 (Utah
Ct.App.1993). Nor can we reasonably infer tbe missing
findings from tbe record before us. See id. The trial court
included findings on Husband's mirumal efforts to search
for a job following his termination and Husband's ultimate
decision to work with a low-paying multi-level marketing
company. However, tbe trial court's findings of Husband's
employment capacity are sparse. It stated that Husband had
degrees "in the computer field" and had the ability to work
"regardless of the health concerns that he has." Extensive
evidence was presented at trial that Husband suffered from
significant health problems *461 that prevented him from
maintaining rigorous or stressful employment or employment
with a restrictive schedule. The only contradictory testimony
provided at trial was that Wife saw Husband doing physical
labor in March 201 I . The trial court may have determined
that Husband's testimony was not credible. On tbe other hand,
it could have concluded that the testimony was credible but
that the health limitations did not preclude certain types of
employment in the fields of computers or teaching, in which
he had previously worked. The trial court never identified
which types of employment for wruch Husband was qualified
and able to do.
,i 14 Tbe trial court's findings on earning potential are equally
sparse. The trial court stated that Husband, who lived with
Wife in Bountiful at the time, was offered a job in Nephi.
Although Husband did testify that he was offered a few jobs,
including the one in Nephi, be later clarified in response to
further questioning by the trial court that be bad discussed
the jobs with potential employers but did not apply and
was not actually offered any jobs. He also testified that be
considered teaching computer science but that the University
of Utah was not hiring, and while the Uruversity of Phoenix
occasionally had part-time positions available, the pay was
too low. In its findings, the trial court mentioned only the job
in Nephi, and it discussed the job in Nepru in the context of
Husband's job search efforts and in calculating the amount
of salary to impute. The trial court never entered a finding
as to whether the job in Nephj was reasonably available in
spite of the distance from Husband's home and Husband's
health limitations or, alternatively, whether it was merely
illustrative of jobs likely to be available to Husband in other
areas of Utah. Nor did the trial court determine whether

other appropriate jobs were reasonably available. Finally, the
trial court never stated that Husband's underemployment was
voluntary.

,i 15 While the trial court's subsidiary findings on Husband's
job search efforts may contribute to a conclusion of voluntary
underemployment, Husband's employment capacity and
earning potential are necessary elements of that analysis.
Given the inadequacy of the trial court's findings on these
elements, we are unable to review the merits of the trial
court's decision to impute income to Husband. \Ve therefore
reverse and remand for the entry of adequately detailed
findings on the relevant factors and for such recalculations or
redetenninations as may then be in order.

II. Dissipation
,i 16 Husband next challenges the sufficiency oftbe evidence
supporting the trial court's finding that Husband dissipated
marital assets. In the alternative, he argues that, at most, the
evidence supports only a finding that he spent $29,364 of
the marital assets on non-fami ly expenses and investmems.
Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by not making adequate findings and by misapplying tbe law
on the issue of dissipation.
[14) ,i 17 Wife counters that Husband did not preserve
a challenge to the trial court's ruling on dissipation. " [I)n
order to preserve an issue for appeal [,) the issue must be
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main Sr. v.
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ,i 51 , 99 P.3d 801 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). However, a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a trial court's
ruling need not be preserved in civil cases. See Utah R. Civ.
P. 52(b); In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ~ 60, 201 P.3d 985 (stating
that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence need not
be preserved, but a challenge to the adequacy of findings
must be). But as with Husband's challenge to the trial court's
imputation of income, we are "prevented from effectively
reviewing the trial court's decision" regarding dissipation
given the inadequacy of the trial court's findings. See Allen v.
Ciokewicz, 20 l 2 UT App I 62, ,i 42, 280 P .3d 425 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).

,i 18 Following the loss of Husband's job, Husband liquidated
$289,909 from stock and retirement accounts during 2008,
2009, and 20 10. Tbe trial court found that Husband "spent
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a lot of money on himself, on trips, on entertainment[,) on

money was spent, including whether funds were used to pay

doing things that were not by way of family expenses." The

legitimate marital expenses or individual expenses, Parker,

trial *462 court determined that it was "reasonable ... to

2000 UT App 30, ~~ 13, l 5, 996 P.2d 565; Thomas, l 999

just assume that it took $88,047"-Husband's average annual

UT App 239, ~ 20, 987 P.2d 603; Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876

salary for the five years before be lost his job-to meet

P.2d 429, 433 (Utah Ct.App. 1994); Andersen v. Andersen,

the family's expenses. The trial court calculated the shortfall
between the asswned fami ly expenses and Hu sband's income

757 P.2d 476,480 (Utah Ct.App.1988); the parties' historical
practices, Thomas, 1999 UT App 239, ii 20,987 P.2d 603; the

(for 2008) or imputed income (for 2009 and 20 l 0). lt then

magnitude of any depletion, Shepherd, 876 P.2d at 433; the

took the difference between the amount Husband liquidated

timing of the challenged actions in relation to the separation

each year and the shortfall for that year. The trial court

and divorce, id.; and any obstructive efforts that hinder the

concluded that any liquidated marital assets used to meet the

valuation of the assets, Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ~~ 49, 53, 299

shortfall between actual or imputed income and the assumed
fami ly expenses were spent on legitimate family expenses.

P.3d 1079; Andrus v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 29 1, ~ 13, 169
P.3d 754. After an "initial showing of apparent dissipation"

But the trial court concluded without further explanation that

by one party, the burden shifts to the other party " to show

any liquidated assets exceeding the shortfall were dissipated.
The trial court's final calculation of the dissipated assets

that the funds were not dissipated, but were used for some
legitimate marital purpose." Parker, 2000 UT App 30,
13,

was $ ) J 6,096. The court then gave Wife a credit for half

15,996 P.2d 565.

~,j

of this amount in distributing the marital property. After
factoring that credit into Wife's share of the remaining marital

[19]

[20]

~

20 When a court finds that a spouse has

property, the trial court awarded Wife the marital borne,

dissipated marital assets, the court should determine the

all of Husband's tax shelter annuity plan, half of Husband's

amount of dissipated assets and calculate the value of the

retirement account, and a judgment against Husband for

marital property as though the assets remained. Goggin, 2013

$12,343. We now tum to the law governing dissipation.

UT 16, ~~ 49, 53,299 P.3d l 079. "As a result, when the court
conducts its equi table distribution of the marital property,

[18] ~ 19 "Section 30-3-5(1) of tbahe other spouse should receive a credit for his or her share
(15]
[1 6]
[17]
of the assets that were dissipated." Id. il 49. But "when a
Utah Code permits courts to issue ' equitable orders' relating
spouse's
behavior prevents the court from determining the
to marital property in divorce cases." Goggin v. Goggin,
2013 UT 16, ~ 47, 299 P.3d 1079. Generally, each party

precise amount of dissipated assets, the court should estimate,

is p resumed to be entitled to half of the marital property.

to the best of its ability, the upper limit ofthe amount of assets

Id. This presumption may be overcome in "exceptional
circumstances." Id. ~ 48 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). "Further, ' the marital estate is [generally] valued at
the time of the divorce decree or trial.'" Id.~ 49 (alteration in

that the spouse may have dissipated." id.~ 53.
~

21 Because the principle of dissipation represents a

deviation from the general rule, *463 its use "must be

original) ( quoting Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 201 I UT App l 6 I, ii
39,257 P.3d 478). However, a trial court has broad discretion

supported by sufficiently detailed findings of fact that explain

to deviate from this general rule when circumstances warrant:

Rappleye, 855 P .2d 260, 262-63 (Utah C t. App.1993); accord
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 201 1 UT App 16 1, ~ 39,257 P.3d478;
see Andersen, 757 P .2d at 479-80 (remanding for additional

"[W]here one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its value
or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in
the exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset

the trial court's basis for such deviation." Rappleye v.

find ings on the issue of dissipation); Peck v. Peck, 738 P .2d
1050, 1051- 52 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (same).

at some time other than the time the decree is entered,
such as at separation," "or may otherwise hold one party

~

22 Here, the trial court's findings are inadequate to explain

accountable to the other for the di ssipation of m arital

its deviation from the general rules governing the valuation

assets."

of marital property. The parties did not dispute that the assets
were liquidated and spent. But the evidence addressing the

Id. (quoting Parker v. Parker, 2000 UT App 30, ~ 13, 996
P .2d 565; Thomas v. Thomas, l 999 UT App 239, ~ 19, 987
P.2d 603). Utah case law suggests a number of factors that
may be relevant to determining whether a party sbouJd be
held accountable for the dissipation of marital assets: bow the

- . .' .

- - --··--·---··· ----·

use of the liquidated assets was disputed, and subsidiary
findings cannot be reasonably implied. See Hall v. Hall, 858
P .2d IO 18, 1025 (Utah Ct.App.1993). The trial court did not
explain why it concluded that the liquidation and spending

- - - ----------~--- ---------- - · - - - - -
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of the assets qualified as d iss ipation. The trial court stated
only that Husband bad "spent a lot of money on himself,
on trips, on entertainment[,] on doing things that were not
by way of family expenses." This finding does not provide
"sufficiently detailed" support fo r the trial court's conclusion.
See Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262-63. Furtbem10re, rather than
calculating the amount of assets actua lly dissipated, the trial
court based its valuation on an assumption of legitimate
family expenses. A trial court may "estimate, to the best
of its ability, the upper limit of the amount of assets that
the spouse may have dissipated." Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ,i
49, 299 P.3d l 079. But such an approach is appropriate
only "when a spouse's behavior prevents the court from
detem1ining the precise amount of dissipated assets." Id. ,i
53; see also Andrus, 2007 UT App 29 I , ii 13, I 69 P.3d 754.
The trial court d id not enter any findings suggesting that
Husband's behavior in any way prevented it from determining
the precise amount of dissipated assets. 5 In fact, as the trial
court acknowledged, extensive testimony and exhibits were
presented regarding how the liquidated funds were spent. The
tria l court stated, "There were many documents filed and
statement[s] as to what income and expenses were. There
was much that would have taken a forensic accountant to
analyze." When insufficient evidence is presented to the court
to support a finding of dissipation, the general rules governing
the valuation of marital property apply. See Parker, 2000 UT
App 30, ,i~ 13, 15, 996 P.2d 565 (explaining the burdens of
production and persuasion attending a claim of dissipation).
However, if sufficient evidence is presented to the court to
support a finding of dissipation, the trial court must explain

any deviation from the general rule w ith "sufficiently detailed
findings." See Rappleye, 855 P.2d at 262-63.

i! 23

We therefore reverse and remand for the trial coun

to enter more detailed findings determining whether the
liquidated assets were in fact dissipated and what the precise
amount of any dissipated assets was or why the amount of any
dissipated assets must be estimated. We also direct the trial
court to enter any recalculations and redetern1inations as may
then be in order, such as an updated division of the marital
estate, including redivision of the marital home, Husband's
annuity plan, and Husband's retirement account.

CONCLUSION

,i 24 Because the trial court's findings are inadequate, we
are unable to effectively review the trial court's decision to
impute $40,000 in annual income to Husband for purposes
of calculating alimony and to include S116,096 as dissipated
assets in its valuation of the marital property. "Accordingly,
we remand for more detailed findings without restriction
to any corrections or modifications the trial court deems
appropriate." See Baum v. Hayes, 2008 UT App 371 , ,i 16,
196 P.3d 612.

A ll Citations
316 P.3d 455, 750 Utah Adv. Rep. 55,2013 UT App 269

Footno tes
1
We acknowledge, as Wife notes on appeal, that the trial court did not use the term "dissipate" in its ruling. However, the
meaning of the trial court's ruling is clear.
"Although
this section of the Utah Code addresses imputation for the purposes of child support, it is also relevant to
2
imputation in the a limony context." Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App 292, 1114 n. 5, 242 P.3d 787.
See Act of Feb. 7, 2008, ch. 3, § 1245, 2008 Utah Laws 48, 541--42; Act of July 1, 2007, ch. 354, § 4, 2007 Utah Laws
3
2146, 2149.
4
While the current statute no longer refers explicitly to a finding of voluntary unemployment or underemployment, Connell
v. Conne/1, 2010 UT App 139, 1116 n. 4,233 P.3d 836, we conclude that voluntary unemployment and underemployment
remain relevant. see Busche v. Busche, 2012 UT App 16, 11 16, 272 P.3d 7 48 (" Imputation is used when the obligor is
believed to be concealing income or to be shirking in his efforts to earn income." (quoting American Law Inst. , Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations§ 3.14(5) cmt. e(i) (2002))); Fish v. Fish, 2010 UT App
292, 111114-17, 242 P.3d 787 (upholding a trial court's finding of underemployment under the current statute); Griffith v.
Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Utah Ct.App.1998) ("[T)he goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing
their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." (emphasis added)), affd, 1999 UT
78, 985 P.2d 255.
5
We note that Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, 299 P.3d 1079, was issued after the trial court had ruled in the present
case, and thus the trial court did not have the benefit of this guidance when it entered its find ings.
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CREDITOR LISTING
Tanya Rodgers Rayner v. Paul T. Ravner
Case No. 10-470-1766

H/W

CREDITOR'S NAME

CONSIDERATION

PMT
DUE

BALANCE

PMT
AMT

$155,157.00

$2,043.84

$47,750.00

$583.84

J

GMAC

Is, Mortgage (was
paid by wife's family)

J

GMAC

2 nd Mortgage

]

Bank of America

Credit Card - Visa
(Collections)

I 61h

$8,483.00

$280.00

J

Bank of America

Credil Card - Master
Card (Collections)

16ll,

$9,060.00

$260.00

J

Deseret First Credit
Union

Credit Card

25ll,

]

Deseret First Credit
Union

Overdraft

25'h

$1 1,744.25

$360.00

w

Horizon Credit Union

Spouse's Account
(estimate)

201h

$2,000.00

$ 100.00

J

Citi Bank/Sallie Mae

School Loan for
daughter

10th

$14,13 1.85

$200.00

H

Internal Revenue Service

Tax Liability 20 l 0

$7,949.24

$200.00

H

Utah State Tax
Commission

Tax Liability- 20 10

$3,425.07

$ 150.00

TOTAL

it.
i'

$1,566. 17

lf;

$ 100.00

r

,:

$261,266.58

I

[

I:

Ii

$4,277.68

i

I·
i:

i'

